Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2002

Liberty and Property in the Patent Law
John R. Thomas
Georgetown University Law Center, jrt6@law.georgetown.edu

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/307

39 Hous. L. Rev. 569-619 (2002)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

GEORGETOWN LAW
Faculty Publications

March 2010

Liberty and Property in the Patent Law
39 Hous. L. Rev. 569-619 (2002)

John R. Thomas
Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center
jrt6@law.georgetown.edu
This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/307/
Posted with permission of the author

ARTICLE
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY
IN THE PATENT LAW
John R. Thomas*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

PATENTING As PRIVATIZATION ............................................ 571

II. PATENTING AND PUBLIC ADVOCACy .................................... 580
A. Patenting Abortion ........................................................ 580
B. Patenting Law ............................................................... 585
C. Patenting Speech ........................................................... 588

III. PATENT ENFORCEMENT AS STATE ACTION .......................... 592
A. Patent Fundamentals and State Action ........................ 594
B. The Licensing Cases ...................................................... 597
C. The Speech Cases ........................................................... 599
IV. CONTEMPORARY PATENTING TRENDS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES ............................................ 606
V.

CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 619

Patents have seldom troubled civil libertarians. A
specialized form of property, patents seemed pertinent to the
technologies of traditional industry but little else. Patent
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University. I acknowledge with gratitude the
extraordinary hospitality and keen insights of the faculty and staff of the Institute for
Intellectual Property and Information Law at the University of Houston Law Center. I
also thank my fellow participants in this symposium and in faculty workshops at the
Georgetown University Law Center and George Washington University Law School, as
well as Jerry Barron, Bob Brauneis, Julie Cohen, Viet Dinh, Mark Lemley, Greg Maggs,
Richard H. Stern, and Mark Tushnet for their helpful comments on this piece.

569

HeinOnline -- 39 Hous. L. Rev. 569 2002-2003

570

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[39:569

instruments offered their readers mere technical documentation;
patent cases presented no more than the mapping of a text onto
an instantiated artifact; patent policy was principally oriented
toward economic optimization of the length and scope of
protection. l
Unbound from technology, contemporary patent law now
seems a more robust discipline. Modern patent instruments
appropriate a diverse array of techniques that span the entire
range of human endeavor.2 Patent claims, cut loose from physical
moorings, have grown more abstract and oriented toward human
behavior. 3 We have yet to realize fully the consequences of postindustrial patenting, but the potential impact of the patent law
upon personal liberties is becoming more apparent and more
worthy of concern. Although the principles of the patent canon
demonstrate sufficient flexibility to regulate uses of such
inventions as software,4 business methods,5 and genetic
fragments,6 they persist in bearing little regard for civil rights.
The private rule making, made possible through the patent law,
holds the potential to impinge upon individual liberties in ways
not previously considered possible.
This Article begins in Part I with an overview of
contemporary patent acquisition and enforcement. Transformed
to meet the commercial demands of post-industrial enterprise,
the patent system now is marked by limitless subject matter,
lenient public grant, and the possibility of vigorous private
enforcement. Patents were once the province of commercial
enterprises seeking to preserve market share. As suggested by
the notorious human chimera application of Jeremy Rifkin and
1. See John S. Leibovitz, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J.
2251, 2254 (2002) (noting that the length and breadth of patents are "familiar
dimensions ... policy makers can manipulate" to improve economic efficiency).
2. Refer to notes 22-33 infra and accompanying text (discussing the vast array of
subject matter in contemporary patent law); see John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the
Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1139-42 (1999) [hereinafter Thomas, Liberal
Professions] (chronicling patent regime expansion from the technological innovations of
the Industrial Revolution to the broad categories of subject matter patentable today).
3. Refer to notes 22-33 infra and accompanying text (noting the recent increase in
patents issued in areas including art, athletics, architecture, and economics).
4. See generally Wesley L. Austin, Software Patents, 7 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 225,
226-53 (1999) (discussing the case law leading up to and establishing software
patentability in the United States).
5. See generally Kevin M. Baird, Business Method Patents: Chaos at the USPTO or
Business as Usual?, 2001 J.L. TECH. & POLY 347,347-52 (2001) (tracing the history of
business method patentability from initial judicial rejection to modern day acceptance).
6. See generally Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property
Rights in Genes and Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence
Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735 (discussing the "intense controversy" surrounding the
patentability of gene fragments and the response of the U.S. Patent Office).

HeinOnline -- 39 Hous. L. Rev. 570 2002-2003

2002]

LIBERTY & PROPERTY IN PATENT LAW

571

Stewart Newman,7 patenting now offers an accessible mechanism
for the suppression of objectionable behavior.
Part II of this Article explores further the use of patents as
instruments of public advocacy. It discovers in the public rolls
granted patents that regulate access to abortion procedures, limit
the ability to comply with federal law, and suppress speech.
In Part III, this Article concludes that constitutional
protections such as substantive due process, equal protection,
and freedom of speech are unlikely to be of direct application
during patent litigation. The reason is that patentees are not
ordinarily state actors, and thus are unrestricted by the Bill of
Rights. This determination holds startling consequences. If
Congress unduly restricted a fundamental liberty interest, a
facial challenge would prove fatal to the statute. Yet if the U.S.
Patent Office (Patent Office)8 issued identically worded patent
claims to a private actor, the patent could be freely enforced
without regard to constitutional limitations.
Part IV of this Article recognizes that post-industrial
patenting implicates constitutional values in ways that the
venerable patent canon does not acknowledge. Reasoning that
the courts will remain the principal custodians of a patent
system in transition, this Article suggests that the faint but
persistent non delegation doctrine may hold lessons for the
modem patent community. 9 Viewing patents as delegated
rulemaking offers a resonant point of departure for assessing the
scope of patent rights and the procedural merits of longstanding
patent practice. This Article closes by encouraging further
consideration of the nondelegation doctrine as a mechanism for
curbing the excesses of the contemporary patent system.
I.

PATENTING As PRIVATIZATION

The regime of patents stands among the federal
government's early efforts at privatization. In lieu of establishing
a system of national . laboratories or scheme of prizes, the
Framers instead opted to harness the energies of private
enterprise to advance the "useful ArtS."lO In the style of a Letter
7.
Refer to notes 37-51 infra and accompanying text (discussing the human
chimera patent application, which claims a method for combining human and embryo
cells to produce a single embryo).
8. The ''U.S. Patent Office" is more properly termed the United States Patent and
Trademark Office. See 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
9. Refer to notes 294-369 infra and accompanying text (examining the possible
role of the constitutional principle of nondelegation in limiting expansive modern patent
law).
10.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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of Marque, 11 the patent law allows inventors to reap the economic
rewards of their innovative activity.12 The patent law does so by
granting inventors exclusive rights in their claimed inventions. 13
Others bear the duty to avoid the patented invention,14 an
obligation enforced by injunction l5 and monetary damages. 16
The patent system traditionally encouraged innovative
activity only within a discrete aspect of human endeavor. As
conceived by the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623 17 and
applied for nearly four centuries, the patent system concerned
applied technology. IS Pragmatic innovation within the core
disciplines of biology, chemistry, physics, and allied engineering
disciplines was patentable. 19 Matters of aesthetics, business
acumen, social observation, or personal skill remained without
the patent system no matter how novel or innovative. 20 Creative
endeavors within such fields fell within intellectual property
regimes with a less robust set of proprietary rights, or simply
were not amenable to privatization at all. 21
The regulatory scope of the patent system has expanded
dramatically in recent years. Emblematic of this trend is the
11. See u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (empowering Congress to "grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 627 (6th ed. 1991) (defining letter of
marque and reprisal as "laIn authorization formerly granted in time of war by a
government to the owner of a private vessel to capture enemy vessels and goods on the
high seas").
12.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 153-154, 261 (governing patent issuance, provisional, and
ownership rights).
13.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to secure "for limited
times to Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries"); see also 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) ("Every patent shall ... grant to the patentee ... the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States or importing the invention into the United States .... ").
14. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (imposing patent infringement liability for specified acts of
nonavoidance).
15. Id. § 283.
16.
Id. § 284.
17.
See Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 2, at 1143 n.22 (citing to "the
forebearer of contemporary patent legislation, the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623,"
21 Jam. I, ch. 3 (1624)).
18.
See id. at 1143 (suggesting that patent law was originally intended to
encompass only "manufactures," human-made artifacts).
19.
See Orin S. Kerr, Are We Overprotecting Code? Thoughts on First-Generation
Internet Law, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1295 (2000) (recognizing as a fundamental
axiom of traditional patent law that "any patentable invention had to rest on some
interaction with realspace, with the natural world of physics, chemistry, and biology").
20.
See Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 2, at 1181 (noting that matters
including social observation, human behavior, business methods, and aesthetics would be
exempt from the patent system today under the original industrial application standard).
21. Id. (observing that subject matters which "do not involve the creation or
transformation of material objects and are not repeatable in an industrial sense" fail to
satisfy the requisites of patentability).
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1998 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
State Street Bank & Trust Co. u. Signature Financial Group,
Inc. 22 In State Street, the Federal Circuit held that a
computerized system for managing a stock fund constituted
patentable subject matter.23 Rejecting the venerable bar on the
patenting of business methods, the court proclaimed anything
that achieved "a useful, concrete and tangible result" was eligible
for patenting. 24 Soon after, another Federal Circuit opinion said it
best: "virtually anything is patentable."25
The State Street decision held dramatic consequences for the
patent system. Industries long strangers to patenting, such as
insurance, financial services, and advertising, have begun filing
applications at the Patent Office. 26 E-commerce patent litigation
has already entered the judicial arena, with hardly a week
passing without word of another lawsuit filed pertaining to a
patented advertising, auction, or sales technique. 27 Patents
appropriating such unlikely techniques as artistic methods,28
athletic moves,29 architecturalstyles,30 and macroeconomic
theories 31 would once have been relegated to a popular
compilation of unusual patents,32 but now they have become too
commonplace to ignore. The patent system has once again
entered the public consciousness, inspiring numerous editorials
and commentaries. 33

22.
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
23. Id. at 1370.
24. Id. at 1373, 1375-77.
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1384, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
25.
(Clevenger, J., dissenting from an order denying rehearing en bane).
26. See Jeffrey A. Berkowitz, Business-Method Patents: How to Protect Your Clients'
Interests, 688 PLIIPAT. 7, 9-11 (2002) (emphasizing the "new era" importance of patents
in the business community and other traditionally nontechnical areas).
27. See Karen Rodriguez, Dot-coms Scramble for Patent Protection in Record
Numbers, Bus. J., Sept. 8, 2000, at 9 (reporting a "swelling rash" of patent infringement
lawsuits following a dramatic increase in Internet patent grants), available at 2000 WL
26139882.
28.
U.S. Patent No. 6,022,219 (issued Feb. 8, 2000) ("Painting Kit and Related
Method").
29. U.S. Patent No. 5,616,089 (issued Apr. 1, 1997) ("Method ofPutting").
30. U.S. Patent No. 5,806,260 (issued Sept. 15, 1998) ("Restaurant and Hotel
Combination").
31. U.S. Patent No. 6,112,188 (issued Aug. 29, 2000) ("Privatization Marketplace").
32. E.g., RICK FEINBERG, PECULIAR PATENTS: A COLLECTION OF UNUSUAL AND
INTERESTING INVENTIONS FROM THE FILES OF THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE (1994).
33. See Editorial, Patent Wrongs, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2001, at B6 (critiquing the
"abuse" of drug patents by firms in the pharmaceutical industry), available at 2001 WL
2546763; Lawrence M. Sung & Jeff E. Schwartz, Business Method Defense, 22 NAT'L L.J.
33, Apr. 10, 2000, at B8 ("Public scrutiny of patent protection in the United States has
arguably risen to unprecedented levels.").
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Once the patent system was restricted to technology.34 The
contemporary consensus is that patenting embraces the entire
commercial world. 35 Now a persistent trend suggests that the
patent system holds further possibilities for other sorts of
innovators.36 Having fully embraced post-industrial innovation,
our patent system is now ripe for postmodern uses. Formerly the
province of technology-driven enterprises seeking to appropriate
the physical artifacts they brought to market, the patent system
now offers a robust mechanism for preemption of the behaviors,
techniques, and activities that political actors wish to segregate
from the marketplace of ideas. Stated succinctly, the U.S. patent
system has already begun to serve as an instrument for public
advocacy.
Consider the human chimera application recently filed by
noted anti-biotechnology crusader Jeremy Rifkin. 37 Through
organized protest and passionate writing, Rifkin has advanced
his strident objections to biotechnology for over two decades. 38
Among his concerns is the patenting of living inventions. 39 Rifkin
holds that biotechnology patents demean life, disrupt the
traditions of the agricultural community, encourage genetic
prospecting of the pharmacopeia of traditional peoples, and
accelerate the advance of a technology which holds fearful
consequences for humanity.40 Rifkin's protests reached the U.S.
Supreme Court through the mechanism of an amicus curiae brief
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.41 Although ultimately holding that
bioengineered microorganisms were patentable, the Court
acknowledged Rifkin's concerns as a "parade of horribles" that
Congress should address. 42
34.
Refer to notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text (commenting on the
historical confinement of the patent regime to artifacts of the Industrial Revolution).
35.
Refer to notes 22-33 supra and accompanying text (discussing the Federal
Circuit's decision in State Street and its aftermath).
36. Id.; see also Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 2, at 1140-41 ("[Tlhe scope
of the statutory term 'process' appears co-extensive with nearly any possible endeavor
[thatl can be articulated in a series of steps in the fashion of patent instrument.").
37. The patent application, covering the production of chimeras up to 50% human,
was filed on December 18, 1997. Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal
Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 443 (1999).
38. See Paul S. Naik, Biotechnology Through the Eyes of an Opponent: The
Resistance of Activist Jeremy Rifkin, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 'J['J[ 5, 15-17 (2000).
39. Id. 'J['J[ 86-91 (discussing Rifkin's beliefs that the patenting of life forms would
lead to adverse and far-reaching genetic and social impacts).
40. Id. 'J['J[ 18-31.
41. 447 U.S. 303 (1980); see also Naik, supra note 38, at 'J['J[ 85-91 (summarizing
Rifkin's three main arguments in his amicus brief opposing the grant of a patent for a
genetically altered bacterium).
42. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 316-18.
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Rifkin's long-held views suggest that he would be loathe to
file a patent application claiming an invention of biotechnology.
Not so. Along with cellular biologist Dr. Stuart Newman, Rifkin
has recently filed a patent application claiming a method for
combining human and animal embryo cells to produce a single
embryo.43 This embryo could then be implanted in a human or
animal surrogate mother, resulting in the birth of a "chimera," or
mixture of the two species. 44 The Newman-Rifkin application
specifically mentions chimeras made in part "from mice,
chimpanzees, baboons, and pigs.,,45 Researchers have
experimented with these hybrid beings as subjects for drug
testing and as a source of replacement organs for ailing
humans. 46
Newman and Rifkin are unusual inventors in that they hope
that their patent application is ultimately rejected. 47 Their aim is
to provoke debate on the patentability ofliving inventions. 48 They
do not seek to practice their invention, and hope that others will
not either. 49 Yet Newman and Rifkin must realize that if the
Patent Office does allow their patent to issue, they still will have
gained a victory of sorts. As patentees, Newman and Rifkin
would be appointed the private regulators of chimera
technology. 50 Most notably, any issued patent would enable them
to enforce a twenty-year moratorium on the use of chimera
technology within the United States. 51
The human chimera application presents a compelling
example of using patents to block the objectionable behavior of
others. It is not an isolated one. The roll of granted patents
already suggests the very real prospects of a pro-life group filing
43. See Magnani, supra note 37, at 446 (describing the three techniques covered
under the Rifkin-Newman patent application for combining human and animal cells).
44. Id. at 445-46 (comparing one technique covered by the patent to a procedure
used in the 1980s to create an animal called a "geep" that was part goat and part sheep).
45.
Id. at 446-47.
46.
See Paul Recer, Debate on Cell Research May Lead to Judicial Definition of
"Human," DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 19, 1999, at 4A.
47. See Magnani, supra note 37, at 443 (noting that Newman and Rifkin hope for
rejection to result in Patent Office procedural alterations to prohibit future patenting of
similar genetic manipulation techniques).
48. Id. at 443, 459.
49. See id. at 443 (explaining that by obtaining the patent, Newman and Rifkin
hope to prevent other scientists from creating human-animal chimeras long enough to
convince the American public to support an outright ban on such techniques).
50. See Recer, supra note 46, at 4A (recounting that, according to Rifkin, the
human-chimera patent would cover all research activities in which scientists insert
human genes into laboratory animals).
51. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (providing that a patent term begins on
the issue date and ends twenty years from the application filing date).
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a patent application claiming an abortion-inducing substance, a
human rights organization appropriating a racial profiling
technique, or one political party claiming that another's soft
money campaign financing infringes its intellectual property
rights. Whether or not Newman and Rifkin are judged to be the
inventors of human chimera technology, they may one day be
identified as the champions of a provocative and distorting use of
the patent system. The early stewards of our patent system never
envisioned the prospect of public advocates anticipating
objectionable activities, prosecuting patent applications, and
being granted a proprietary interest in prohibitive regulation. 52
Historical suspicions aside, the consequences of a postmodern
patent system are disturbing for other reasons.
One concern arises from the fact that the patent right is an
exceptionally robust one. Although the twenty-year patent term
is short in comparison to other intellectual property rights,53 few
restraining doctrines allay a patent's scope of exclusivity.
Liability rests solely upon a comparison of the text of the patent
instrument with an accused infringement, whether or not the
defendant derived the invention from the patentee. 54 The patent
law also lacks an effective defense in the nature of copyright
law's fair use privilege. 55 Nor does patent law charge the patentee
with practicing the patented invention in order to fulfill public
demand. 56 Patent proprietors have successfully employed their
intellectual property to suppress technology in the past. 57 There
is little reason to suspect that patents may not be used
successfully as moratoria in the future.

52. Cf Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 2, at 1164 (suggesting that the
Framers viewed patentable subject matter as including only the industrial, mechanical,
and manual arts of the late eighteenth century).
53. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (providing that a patent term is ordinarily
twenty years from the date of filing of the patent application), with 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)
(2000) (stating that a basic copyright term endures the life of the author plus seventy
years).
54. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAw 860-61
(1998).
55. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1181-211 (2000) (arguing for a patent law fair use defense in order
to fill increasingly apparent gaps in existing law).
56. See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a
Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 389, 402 (2002) [hereinafter
Saunders, Patent Nonuse] ("As a general rule, a patentee is not obligated, under either
patent or antitrust laws, to use or allow others to use a patent.").
57. See generally Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 884-916 (1990) (finding that patentees' use of
broad claims in various industries often had the effect of considerably slowing the pace of
technological improvements).
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Current trends in the administration of the patent regime
should sound further alarms. Persistent commentary contends
that the work product of the Patent Office suffers from
diminished quality. 58 Many newly issued patents appear to
appropriate familiar concepts that lie within the public domain.
One claims an auction method that allegedly has been used at
the U.S. Treasury Department for decades. 59 Another patented
invention, allowing a restaurant to sell aged food at reduced
prices, bears a strong resemblance to a baker's sale of day-old
bread. 60 Still another, heralded by the Wall Street Journal as a
"billion-dollar patent," claims a computerized process for carrying
out an international transaction that some analysts say has been
61
used in the field for many years.
Perhaps the most notorious business method patent,
Amazon.com's "one-click" patent,62 also appears to privatize an
everyday commercial activity. The Amazon.com patent claims a
method of ordering merchandise on the Internet with a single
action, such as one click of a mouse button. 63 Yet anyone who has
used a vending machine seems to have engaged in single-action
ordering. Amazon.com nevertheless convinced the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington to issue a
preliminary injunction shutting down a competing streamlined
purchasing method. 64 Believing that the accused infringer would
likely prevail in its patent invalidity argument, the Federal
Circuit ultimately overturned the preliminary injunction. 65 The
58. E.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 577, 588-91 (1999) [hereinafter Merges, Six Impossible Patentsl.
59. U.S. Patent No. 5,897,620 (issued Apr. 27, 1999) ("Method and Apparatus for
the Sale of Airline-Specified Flight Tickets"); see also Byron L. Winn, Readers Say:
Patently Absurd?, FORBES, May 31, 1999, at 18 (claiming the Priceline.com patent is akin
to a business method used by the U.S. Treasury Department, known as the "Dutch
Auction").
60. U.S. Patent No. 6,052,667 (issued Apr. 18, 2000) ("Method and Apparatus for
Selling an Aging Food Product as a Substitute for an Ordered Product"); see also Julia
Angwin, "Business-Method" Patents, Key to Priceline, Draw Growing Protest, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 3, 2000, at B1.
61. William F. Bulkeley, E-Business: A Billion-Dollar Patent?-Software Developer
Is Seeking to Protect Process Using Internet for Foreign Trade, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2000,
at B1 (noting that anyone conducting computer-to-computer international trades over the
Internet is a potential patent infringer).
62. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999) ("Method and System for
Placing a Purchase Order via a Communications Network").
63. Id.
64. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1249 (W.D.
Wash. 1999).
65. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
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parties have since settled their dispute,66 leaving an
improvidently granted patent to linger on the public rolls.
Having enjoyed two holiday seasons with the injunction in place,
Amazon.com ought not be terribly disappointed with the Federal
Circuit's decision.
Numerous factors explain our increasingly porous Patent
Office. Thanks in part to broader judicial pronouncements of
patentable subject matter, the number of filed patent
applications has risen dramatically.67 Actors within the financial,
insurance, and healthcare management industries, once without
the patent system, now aggressively seek patent protection. 68 The
advent of the TRIPS Agreement,69 a component of the World
Trade Organization Agreement, has also significantly
strengthened foreign patent regimes. 70 Innovative enterprises are
more eager to obtain patent rights overseas than ever before, and
they typically commence this process by filing a domestic
application. 71 The Patent Office also finds itself strapped for cash
and short of qualified examiners. 72 Miserly congressional policies
have stripped funding from the Patent Office, and the high
demand for skilled, knowledgeable workers makes hiring
qualified technical personnel more difficult. 73
'
The stewards of our patent system have not only proclaimed
all things patentable, but they have ensured that patents are

66. Amazon Settles Suit Against Online Rival Over Buying Shortcut, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 8, 2002, at B5.
67. Bruce Kisliuk & Jessie Marshall, Business Is Booming, 1 PTO TODAY 1, 17-19
(Jan. 2000), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/ptotoday/Ol.pdf (last visited
Sept. 11, 2002).
68. Berkowitz, supra note 26, at 9-11.
69. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS
Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_eltrips_eI
LagmO_e.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2002).
70. See J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property
Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAw. 345, 34560 (1995) (analyzing the effects of the TRIPS Agreement on patent protection in both
developed and developing countries).
71. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 361-368 (2000) (governing international applications filed in
the United States).
72. See Merges, Six Impossible Patents, supra note 58, at 606-07 (commenting on
the high examiner turnover rate, caused in part by the low salaries earned by senior
examiners and inadequate training for inexperienced examiners).
73. See generally John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker:
Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 727,
728-30, 741-44 (2002) !hereinafter Thomas, Rulemakerl (arguing that budgetary
constraints, increasing filing rates, and the broadening range of patentable subject matter
contribute to the need for patent administration reform).
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easier to obtain than ever before. 74 A confluence of lax public
grant and the possibility for vigorous private enforcement has
transformed the patent system into the ultimate regulatory
regime. The appropriation of any technique, protocol, or behavior
engagement, not to preserve market share but to suppress its
practice, seems a very real possibility.75
Patent law is not· always the best tool for the political
advocate. Patents must disclose an invention not already
available within the public domain,76 which requires advocates to
anticipate behaviors they find objectionable. The Patent Ace7
also requires that issued patent instruments fully disclose the
invention they appropriate,78 a complication for patentees who
wish to suppress their inventions. As well, patent rights
ordinarily extend only twenty years from the date the application
was filed. 79 Patents also tend to be difficult to enforce against the
state. For example, the federal government may not be enjoined
from practicing the patented invention,80 and recent Supreme
Court decisions have rendered enforcement against state
governments uncertain. 81 Still, where the technique will likely be
practiced only for a discrete period of time, the actors of concern
are private entities, and the number of potential infringers is
limited, the patenting of that technique presents a neglected
possibility for public advocacy.
Patenting has prompted concerned commentary throughout
its history. When patents were confined to technology, observers
tied the patent system to such issues as pricing, public health,
and industry concentration. 82 Now that our patent system has
74. See id. (citing reports that the Patent Office has become lenient, awarding as
many as 97% of all applications, some of which appropriate knowledge considered within
the public domain).
75. See generally Saunders, Patent Nonuse, supra note 56, at 391-92 (noting that
technology suppression through patent nonuse--when a patentee fails to commercialize
the patented product or process--"is not simply a matter of anecdotal fiction or folklore"
but a "coqtemporary reality").
76. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (governing the general conditions of patentability,
including novelty and non-obvious subject matter).
77. See id. §§ 1-376.
78. [d. § 112 (requiring "a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it").
79. [d. § 154.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000) (providing that a patent owner's remedy for
infringement by the federal government is limited to compensatory damages).
81. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. ColI. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 630 (1999) (holding that Congress did not have the authority to abrogate states'
immunity from patent infringement claims).
82. See, e.g., Stephen Buckley, U.S., Brazil Clash Over AIDS Drugs, WASH. POST,
Feb. 6, 2001, at Al (discussing the clash between strong intellectual property rights and
the need for generic drugs at low prices).
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engaged virtually every human endeavor, it is time to recognize
that patents do more than measure our nation's economic life.
They present the possibility of impinging upon personal liberties
long associated with core social values. This Article next
considers the ramifications of a postmodern patent system.

II.

PATENTING AND PUBLIC ADVOCACY

This Article considers three broad categories of patenting to
demonstrate these libertarian concerns. Issued patents
appropriating the artifacts and techniques of abortion,
compliance with the tax laws, and speech are discussed in turn.
In each of these fields, the work product of the Patent Office is
allowed to speak for itself; in some cases actual litigation or
licensing experience informs the inquiry. Part narration and part
blueprint, this Article considers the place of patenting in a
strategy for private rulemaking.
A. Patenting Abortion

The legislatures of the various states have persistently
attempted to restrict access to abortion procedures. Some of the
legislative measures have imposed residency requirements;83
others have required that a married woman notify her husband
that she was about to undergo the proceduret still others have
restricted the performance of a particular abortion technique. 85
Supreme Court rulings addressing such restrictions have come to
constitute major media events, each one so thoroughly
scrutinized that they have come to form part of the national legal
consciousness.
Less well known is that, alongside state legislatures, the
Patent Office also has issued what amounts to regulations
governing the performance of abortions. The roll of granted
patents includes an extensive array of products and processes for
causing early termination of pregnancy. Many of these patents
concern pharmacological compounds. For example, one patent
instrument claims "a method of terminating pregnancy in

83. See Andrew J. Ries, Extraterritoriality of Restrictive State Abortion Laws: States
Can Abort Plans to Abort at Home but Not Abroad, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1209 & n.30
(1992).
84. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992) (scrutinizing
Pennsylvania's abortion law to this effect).
85. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 4.28 U.S. 52, 75-76 (1976) (discussing
Missouri's prohibition of saline amniocentesis as an abortion technique after the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy).
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mammals" by administering a gonadotropic hormone;86 another a
method of terminating pregnancy through administration of
specific esters;87 still another bears the blunt title: "Abortion by
Myometrial Administration of Prostaglandins.,,88
Other patents appropriate abortion methodologies in the
nature of surgical tools and procedures. For example, two related
patents concern the use of such disposable medical instruments
as a speculum and a cannula. 89 Several others appropriate a
method of terminating pregnancy prematurely through the use of
an "abortifacient."9o When presenting claims to the Patent Office,
patent solicitors have occasionally exhibited a crude awareness of
judicial developments. Seemingly aware of the now outdated
trimester approach of Roe v. Wade,91 for example, one 1974 patent
limited itself to a specified "process for performing an
abortion ... during approximately the first 24 weeks of
pregnancy. ,,92
These patent instruments do more than garnish an
inventor's wall. Recent experience with the pharmacological
compound mifepristone demonstrates that patents matter to the
availability of abortion procedures in the United States. Dr.
Etienne-Emile Baulieu invented mifepristone in 1980 and
assigned the patent to his employer, the French firm Roussel
Uclaf.93 Commonly known as the abortion pill or RU-486,
mifepristone curbs embryo growth and can cause the abortion of
early-stage pregnancies. 94 Among the significant obstacles to
marketing mifepristone in the United States was the Roussel
Uclaf patent. 95 Activists eventually succeeded in convincing
86. U.S. Patent No. 5,356,876 (issued Oct. 18, 1994) ("Methods of Terminating
Pregnancy").
87. U.S. Patent No. 4,073,899 (issued Feb. 14, 1978) ("Method of Terminating
Pregnancy").
88. U.S. Patent No. 3,852,465 (issued Dec. 3, 1974).
89. U.S. Patent No. 3,835,843 (issued Sept. 17, 1974) ("Medical Instruments"); U.S.
Patent No. 3,769,980 (issued Nov. 6, 1973) ("Medical Instruments").
90.
E.g., U.S. Patent No. 3,722,500 (issued Mar. 27, 1973) ("Abortive Device and
Method").
91. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-73 (1992) (rejecting Roe's
rigid and unnecessary trimester framework and adopting instead the "undue burden" test
to scrutinize abortion restrictions before viability).
92. U.S. Patent No. 3,848,602 (issued Nov. 19, 1974) ("Abortion Facilitating Device
and Process").
93.
Leonard A. Cole, Abortions Will Be Moot Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1989, at A17.
94. See Rachel Zimmerman & Sarah Lueck, FDA Approves the RU-486 Abortion
Pill, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2000, at A3 (discussing the ability of RU-486 to terminate
pregnancies up to seven weeks).
95. See Sharon Bernstein, Secret Deals, Big Money and Abortion Politics to Bring
RU-486 to This Country, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 26, 2000, at G1 (describing the Clinton
Administration's "efforts to persuade Roussel Uclafto either bring the drug to the United
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Roussel Uclafto assign the mifepristone patent to the Population
Council,96 a nonprofit organization concerned with reproductive
health and population growth. 97 The Population Council's
ownership of the pertinent patent rights was among the factors
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) considered in its
September 28, 2000, decision approving the sale of mifepristone
in the United States. 98
Mifepristone might not be available in the United States had
more politically conservative individuals controlled Roussel
Uelaf. Had Dr. Baulieu's patent been assigned to say, the
National Right to Life Committee, it could have insisted it be
informed about any marketing plans concerning mifepristone. At
a minimum, the FDA would have been statutorily required to
delay issuing marketing approval on mifepristone for thirty
months, or at least until the validity and infringement of the
patent were judicially determined. 99 Although the Population
Council seems unlikely to part with the mifepristone patent,lOO a
robust registry of issued patents appropriates other abortion
techniques and medications. lol The possibility of an anti-abortion
group purchasing such a patent and using it to restrict access to
the elaimed invention is a real one.
Patents may be conceived as a sort of private legislation. Yet
important distinctions exist between public laws and privately
held patents concerning abortion procedures. One is that any
legislatively enacted measure restricting access to abortion
procedures would be subject to constitutional review. The most
recent abortion case from the U.S. Supreme Court, Stenberg v.
Carhart,102 suggests that a blanket restriction on the use of a
particular abortion technique would be unlikely to survive such
States or give up its [U.S.) patent rights").
96. See id.
97. See Population Council (detailing the Population Council's mISSIOn and
accomplishments), at http://www.popcouncil.org/about/about.html (last visited Aug. 10,
2002).
98. See Zimmerman & Lueck, supra note 94, at A3 (indicating that the Population
Council "will conduct studies of the drug after it is marketed and report back to the FDA
with the results").
99. See Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have
They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 391 & n.6 (1999) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)
(1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)-(4) (1994)).
100. See Zimmerman & Lueck, supra note 94, at A3 (indicating that the Population
Council has received grants and loans to develop mifepristone from "prominent investors,
including foundations set up by Warren Buffett, George Soros and the late David
Packard").
101. Refer to notes 86-88 supra and accompanying text (providing examples of
patents issued for novel products and processes causing early termination of pregnancy).
102. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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oversight. 103 In Stenberg, the Nebraska legislature criminalized
the performance of a partial-birth abortion, unless the procedure
was necessary to save the life of the mother. l04 The Supreme
Court struck down the statute in part because the statute did not
sufficiently account for the health of the mother .105 The Stenberg
decision suggests that, at least prior to the viability of the fetus,
laws restricting access to a particular abortion technique must
exempt situations where that technique is the safest alternative
for the pregnant woman. lOG
Much like the statute in Stenberg, each issued abortion
patent provides the virtually unfettered right to exclude others
from using the claimed technique. l07 Yet the possibility of judicial
imposition of a health-based exception during private patent
enforcement matters is questionable, to say the least. Neither the
patent statute nor any issued patent instrument exempts
individuals from patent infringement based upon their individual
health needs. Closest is a recently enacted provision declaring
patents on surgical procedures unenforceable against medical
practitioners. lOB However, this legislation allows enforcement
proceedings against individuals not formally licensed to practice
medicine and in no way restricts the enforcement of patented
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, or biotechnologies. l09
Another potential hook within the patent statute is the
provision governing injunction awards. The Patent Act
counsels courts to apply traditional equitable principles in
deciding whether or not to enjoin adjudicated infringers. no
Although public health concerns would seem to hold a
103. See id. at 921-22, 938-39 (declaring the Nebraska statute's ban on "partialbirth abortions," including both dilation and evacuation ("D & E") and dilation and
extraction ("D & X") procedures, unconstitutional because it imposed an undue burden on
a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy).
104. [d. at 921-22.
105. [d. at 922, 931-32.
106. See id. at 935-38 (reviewing conflicting medical studies on partial-birth abortion
techniques and concluding that a statutory ban on D & X "creates a significant health
risk"; therefore, "[tJhe statute ... must contain a health exception" that permits the use of
D & E as a safer alternative).
107. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (providing the patent owner's right to exclude
others from specified acts throughout the United States).
108. [d. § 287(c).
109. See Brett G. Alten, Left to One's Devices: Congress Limits Patents on Medical
Procedures, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 837, 840-41 (1998) ("Section
287(c) precludes a plaintiff from filing a civil action for either monetary damages or
injunctive relief against a medical practitioner or against a related health care entity for
performing a 'medical activity."').
110. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 ("[AJ ... court [) may grant injunctions in accordance with
the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such
terms as the court deems reasonable.").
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prominent place in such an inquiry, the case law suggests that
courts focus more strongly upon the patentee's proprietary
interest. Observing that "the right to exclude recognized in a
patent is but the essence of the concept of property,,,lll courts
rely less often on health concerns than the oft-cited admonition
that "protecting patents from would-be infringers is always
acting in the public interest.,,112 As explained by one district
court:
While the public interest is unquestionably advanced
through the marketing of potentially lifesaving
devices ... , Congress has determined it better for the
nation in the long run to afford the inventors of novel,
useful and non-obvious products short-term exclusivity
on such products rather than to permit free competition
in the goods. Congress has not seen fit to differentiate
between what might be referred to as lifesaving devices
and those of a more trivial or less important nature.
The public interest is served by granting injunctions to
effectuate patent rights. 113
With little support from the statute or judicial discretion,
an accused infringer of a patented medical method or
technique may seek refuge in the Constitution. Patents on
abortion methods and devices seemingly raise the identical
substantive due process issues parsed in Stenberg u. Carhart.114
However, the ability of a defendant in a patent infringement
litigation to invoke this guarantee is not entirely clear.
Constitutional defenses apply only against government
entities or, under the state action doctrine, nominally private
parties that enjoy sufficient connections with the
government. l15 Whether private patentees rise to this level or
not must be subjected to further analysis. Before turning to
this issue, this Article considers other patents that implicate
constitutional values.

111. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
112. Pittway v. Black & Decker, 667 F. Supp. 585, 593 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
113. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1439, 1445 (E.D. Pa.
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
114. 530 U.S. 914, 920-21 (2000) (considering the matter "in light of the
Constitution's guarantees of fundamental individual liberty").
115. See Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 592-93 (1991) ("A litigant seeking the protection of these
guarantees must establish that the allegedly unconstitutional conduct complained of ,may
fairly be said to be that of the state.'").
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B. Patenting Law

Surely State Street stands among the Federal Circuit's most
important decisions. 116 Here, the court coolly proclaimed all
things patentable. l17 It was in State Street that the Federal
Circuit voided 374 years of common law tradition by declaring
business methods patentable;1l8 jettisoned controlling legal
precedent including more finely tuned distinctions regarding the
patentability of computer software;119 and collapsed the statutory
subject matter requirement into the more lenient requirement of
utility. 120 Following State Street, an invention need merely
achieve a "useful, concrete and tangible result" to be appropriate
· 121
fior pat ent mg.
The court's string of magisterial pronouncements have
diverted attention from the nature of the patent enforced in State
Street. The Federal Circuit described the Signature patene22 as
claiming "a data processing system ... for implementing an
investment structure which was developed for use in Signature's
business as an administrator and accounting agent for mutual
funds.,,123 The secondary literature has tended to categorize
Signature's patented invention as software, a computerimplemented financial product or business method. 124
116. See Gregory J. Maier & Robert C. Mattson, State Street Bank in the Context of
the Software Patent Saga, 8 GEO. MAsON L. REV. 307, 307-08 (1999) (emphasizing State
Street's "highly significant" impact on computer-implemented business methods).
117. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that statutory language "shows Congress's intent not to place
any restrictions on the subject matter for which a patent may be obtained beyond those
specifically recited in § 101"; noting the Supreme Court's acknowledgement in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), "that Congress intended § 101 to extend to
'anything under the sun that is made by man"').
118. Id. at 1375 ("We take this opportunity to lay th[e] ill-conceived ['business
method'] exception to rest.").
.
119. Id. at 1373-74 (abandoning "the Freeman-Walter-Abele test to determine
whether the claimed subject matter [is] an unpatentable abstract idea" and establishing
that patentable subject matter does not become unpatentable "simply because it uses a
mathematical formula, computer program or digital computer").
120. Id. at 1375 (adopting a "practical utility" approach in lieu of a categorical
approach focused on "the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to--process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter").
121. Id. at 1373.
122. U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (issued Mar. 9, 1993) ("Data Processing System for
Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration"), cited in State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370.
123. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370.
124. See, e.g., Neil F. Carlson, Developing Business Process Patents and Intellectual
Property, 82 STRATEGIC FIN., Nov. 1, 2000, at 6468 (describing the Signature patent as
consisting of both a financial structure and a software application), available at 2000 WL
11723053; Stephen Lesavich, Bioinformatic Tools, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 2000, at B10
(describing the Signature patent as a business method patent that has enabled the
biotech industry to protect its inventions with appropriate software patents); Robert
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Closer scrutiny has revealed that the claims of the Signature
patent quite closely track prevailing tax laws and Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) regulations. 125 Under current tax law, a
partnership of pooled stock funds will "[o]rdinarily ... be deemed
a taxable entity.,,126 Once the profits are distributed to investors,
personal income tax on the dividends may be owed as well. 127 The
tax code allows certain master feeder funds to avoid the onus of
double taxation if the partnership follows certain accounting
procedures. 128 The tax laws and IRS regulations call for, among
other steps, the daily allocation of the partnership's profits,
losses, and expenses. 129
It is these accounting procedures that are recited, virtually
word for word, in the claims of the Signature patent. 130 The
Signature patent does add one additional stricture: the books
must be maintained via computer. 131 Given the size of most
pooled-fund partnerships and the complexity of the mandated
transactions, however, the possibility of an idiot savant poring
over the accounting books each evening appears remote. In
practice, these functions must be performed with a computer. As
observed by Richard Stern, the Signature patent "claim[s], in
substance, any 'computerized system for complying with 26
U.S.C. § 706(d)'s requirements for pooled-fund partnerships.",132

Klinger, Learning How to Play, Win the Patent Game, DALLAS Bus. J., Sept. 15, 2000, at
8C (describing the Signature patent as a business method patent implementing an
investment structure).
125. See Richard H. Stern, Scope-or-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights
on Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 12022 (1999).
126. Id. at 120-21.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 121.
129. 26 U.S.C. § 706(d)(2)(A) states:
If during any taxable year of the partnership there is a change in any partner's
interest in the partnership, then ... each partner's distributive share of any
allocable cash basis item shall be determined(i) by assigning the appropriate portion of such item to each day in the
period which it is attributable, and
(ii) by allocating the portion assigned to any such day among the partners in
proportion to their interests in the partnership at the close of such day.
26 U.S.C. § 706(d)(2)(A) (2000).
130. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing the Signature patent as claiming a system that permits
the daily allocation of multiple mutual funds invested in a single portfolio, providing the
exact percentage share that each mutual fund holds in the portfolio while accounting for
daily changes in the values of the mutual fund and the overall portfolio).
131. See id.
132. Stern, supra note 125, at 132.
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The use of patents to restrict access to legal entitlements can
only be described as an unanticipated and disturbing use of the
intellectual property laws. Tax law compliance patents are
potentially only a modest example of the use of private
instruments to thwart legislative intent to establish a broadly
applicable law for the benefit of all citizens. For example,
whatever policy is served through single taxation of pooled-fund
partnerships, Congress presumably intended that any taxpayer
might avail itself of these provisions. The tax laws include their
own detailed set of fines and punishments; providing a private
actor with exclusionary rights and an additional royalty seems
counterintuitive at the least. 133
Despite these apparent concerns, the Federal Circuit has
actually suggested that the legal enactment of a patented
invention weighs in favor of the validity of the claim. Explaining
that the invention claimed by Signature was patentable qua
software, Judge Rich summarized the holding of State Street in
one extraordinary passage:
Today, we hold that the transformation of data,
representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through
a series of mathematical calculations into a final share
price, constitutes a practical application .of a mathematical
algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces "a
useful, concrete and tangible result"-a final share price
momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes and
even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and
in subsequent trades. 134
The patent at issue in State Street should not be understood
as an isolated incident. Many other patents have issued
appropriating techniques of tax and regulatory compliance. 135 The
ironic possibilities created by lenient Patent Office practice have
not been lost on members of the patent bar. In an interesting
exercise in recursion, two licensed patent attorneys were recently
named as inventors on a patent claiming a method of drafting a
patent application. 136 Enforcement of any of these patents would
133. [d. at 133.
134. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 (emphasis added).
135. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,161,098 (issued Dec. 12,2000) ("Method and Apparatus
for Enabling Small Investors with a Portfolio of Securities to Manage Taxable Events
Within the Portfolio"); U.S. Patent No. 6,064,983 (issued May 16, 2000) ("System for
Performing Tax Computations"); U.S. Patent No. 5,987,474 (issued Nov. 16, 1999)
("Computer Aided Maintenance and Repair Information System for Equipment Subject to
Regulatory Compliance"); U.S. Patent No. 5,772,251 (issued June 30, 1998) ("Income Tax
Information Organizer").
136. U.S. Patent No. 6,049,811 (issued Apr. 11, 2000) ("Machine for Drafting a
Patent Application and Process for Doing Same").
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potentially implicate a handful of constitutional values, including
free speech, due process, and equal protection. As constitutional
protections extend only against government actors, however,
their application to patent enforcement matters commenced by
private parties remains unclear. 137 Before considering the
doctrine of state action further, this Article further reviews
patents on speech.

C. Patenting Speech 138
In an article published the same year the Federal Circuit
decided State Street, Professors Mark Lemley and Eugene Volokh
emphasized that free speech issues arose only rarely with regard
to the patent statute. 139 They explained that patentees were able
to prohibit the use or sale of machines, products, and processesactivities that usually did not concern speech. 140 Although Lemley
and Volokh concluded that courts should be mindful of "certain
narrow circumstances" that might implicate First Amendment
concerns, they found the patent law a far less troublesome
doctrine for proponents of free speech than the copyright law. 14l
A glance through the weekly Patent Office Gazette
demonstrates how dramatically the ambit of patenting has
expanded in the few years since Lemley and Volokh wrote their
article. Many recently issued patents appropriate methods of
communication. Some patents appropriate communicative
techniques in the nature of time, place, and manner
restrictions. 142 Others establish content-based restraints on
137. Refer to Part III infra (discussing the state action doctrine in the patent
enforcement context).
138. This subtitle is used with apologies to Professor Dan Burk, who adopted the
identical byline in his thoughtful piece discussing the free speech implications of software
patents. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99 (2000).
139. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 234-36 (1998); see also Andrew
Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The Clash Between
Intellectual Property and the First Amendment From an Economic Perspective, 12
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 33-39 (2001) (explaining that, while "in
general the patent law does not conflict with the First Anlendment" because "prohibiting
third parties from making, using, selling or importing a patented invention does not
involve speech, but rather deals strictly with conduct"; "the patent owner's right to
prohibit anyone from offering the invention for sale [does] restrict[] commercial
speech .... which the Supreme Court has viewed as within the domain of the First
Anlendment free speech protection").
140. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 139, at 234.
141. Id. at 237.
142. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,370,161 (issued Apr. 9, 2002) ("Time Synchronization of
Distributed Computer Telephony Communication Applications in a Computer Network");
U.S. Patent No. 6,351,647 (issued Feb. 26, 2002) ("Location-Dependent Services in a
Mobile Communication System"); U.S. Patent No. 6,424,840 (issued July 23, 2002)
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speech. 143 Significantly, although the copyright law has developed
a nuanced fair use privilege to deal with speech concerns, no such
defense exists within the patent law. 144 The case can readily be
made that the patent law allows private actors to impose more
significant restraints on speech than has ever been possible
through copyright.
Internet advertiser DoubleClick's aggressive enforcement of
its portfolio of electronic commerce patents exemplifies this
claim. DoubleClick sued two competitors, L90 Inc. and 2417
Media, to enforce its patent on a "Method of Delivering,
Targeting, and Measuring Advertising over Networks."145 At the
last minute the parties settled DoubleClick's infringement claim,
thereby narrowly avoiding trial. 146 Internet service provider Juno
Online Services, Inc. was not so fortunate. NetZero, Inc. filed suit
against Juno in federal district court, charging infringement of
its patented method of displaying advertisements in floating
windows.147 On January 5, 2001, the court issued a restraining
order that prohibited Juno from practicing the patented
invention through March 15, 2001. 148
First Amendment principles were notably absent from the
DoubleClick case. 149 Had a content-neutral law constrained
speech in the fashion of any of these patents, courts would have
reviewed the law as a time, place, or manner restriction. This
analysis would have considered such factors as the existence of
adequate alternative channels for communication and whether
the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve a specific
government interest. 15o The courts have yet to subject a patent to

("Method and System for Dynamic Location-Based Zone Assignment for a Wireless
Communications Network").
143. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,767,893 (issued June 16, 1998) ("Method and Apparatus
for Content Based Downloading of Video Programs").
144. Refer to notes 228-34 infra and accompanying text (discussing the fair use
privilege in the context of speech cases). .
145. Thomas, Rulemaker, supra note 73, at 736--37 (citing DoubleClick, L90 Settle
Patent Lawsuit, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 2000, at A44 [hereinafter Doubleclickl, available at
2000 WL 10042990); see also U.S. Patent No. 5,948,061 (issued Sept. 7, 1999).
146. Thomas, Rulemaker, supra note 73, at 737 (citing DoubleClick, supra note 145,
atA44).
147. Nancy Weil, NetZero Suit Hits Juno with a Restraining Order, INFOWORLD
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 6585545 [hereinafter Weil, NetZero
Suit]; see also U.S. Patent No. 6,157,946 (issued Dec. 6, 2000) ("Communication System
Capable of Providing User with Picture Meeting Characteristics of User and Terminal
Equipment and Information Providing Device Used for the Same").
148. Weil, NetZero Suit, supra note 147.
149. Thomas, Rulemaker, supra note 73, at 737.
150. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-2, at 791-92 (2d
ed.1988).
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similar scrutiny, perhaps out of the belief that constitutional
limitations on government actions do not apply to patent
litigation commenced by private parties.
The advertising patents seem a rather humble lot in
comparison with other patents that directly regulate the content
of speech. Patented voter and consumer surveying techniques are
among this more troublesome group. One recently issued patent,
directed towards a "method of administering a survey,"
appropriates in part the steps of '~transmitting the respondent
question to the respondent" and "receiving a response from the
respondent."151 Since the Federal Circuit issued State Street,
marketing and sales techniques have also been subjected to
private appropriation. One such patent, relating to home
improvement, includes the step of "presenting the design ideas to
a client" as part of the claimed invention. 152 The number of
patents on personal instruction is also impressive. For example,
individuals have patented methods of teaching language,153
. 't'lOn, 155 d'la1ogue wn't'lng, 156 and
. 154 vocabu 1ary acqUlsl
musIC,
157
mathematics.
Government regulation of the communicative impact of
expression is ordinarily subjected to strict scrutiny.158 Only those
regulations that are narrowly tailored and necessary to serve a
compelling state interest will be upheld. 159 Yet all indications
from the courts are that privately held patents offer their owners
the ability to suppress or punish speech without reference to
these limitations. 16o
151. U.S. Patent No. 6,093,026 (issued July 25, 2000) ("Method and Apparatus for
Administering a Survey").
152. U.S. Patent No. 5,668,736 (issued Sept. 16, 1997) ("Method for Designing and
Illustrating Architectural Enhancements to Existing Buildings").
153. U.S. Patent No. 5,649,826 (issued July 22, 1997) ("Method and Device for
Teaching Language").
154. U.S. Patent No. 6,015,947 (issued Jan. 18,2000) ("Method of Teaching Music").
155. U.S. Patent No. 6,120,297 (issued Sept. 19, 2000) (''Vocabulary Acquistion [sic]
Using Structured Inductive Reasoning").
156. U.S. Patent No. 5,102,338 (issued Apr. 7, 1992) ("Method for Training Children
in the Art of Dialogue Writing").
157. U.S. Patent No. 6,155,836 (issued Dec. 5, 2000) ("System for Teaching
Mathematics").
158. TRIBE, supra note 150, § 12-2, at 791-92. Professor Tribe further notes that
government regulation directed at the "communicative impact" of an act is considered
unconstitutional unless the government demonstrates "that the message being
suppressed poses a 'clear and present danger,' constitutes a defamatory falsehood, or
otherwise falls on the unprotected side of one of the lines the Court has drawn to
distinguish those expressive acts privileged by the first amendment from those open to
government regulation with only minimal due process scrutiny." [d.
159. [d. § 12-2, at 796.
160. Refer to notes 161-66 infra and accompanying text (discussing two recent
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Even where the patent does not itself claim speech, freedom
of expression issues have arisen in other ways with respect to the
patent system. Patentees have become increasingly active
against individuals who criticize their proprietary interests. Two
patent infringement lawsuits reported on the website of The
Intellectual Property Owners Association, a public advocacy
organization which principally represents patent owners, are
notable for the free speech issues that they raise. 161 Noted
Washington, D.C. lawyer and educator Harold C. Wegner serves
as the defendant in one patent infringement lawsuit. 162 The
plaintiff, Martin Gardner Reiffin, does not contend that Wegner
made, used, or sold the patented invention. Instead, in the words
of the Federal Circuit, Reiffin's "suit alleged that Wegner
conspired with Microsoft [Corporation] to undermine the value of
Reiffin's patents and libeled Reiffin by making statements to his
law school class and publishing articles on his Internet site that
referred to Reiffin's patents as 'submarine patents."'163
Techsearch L.L.C. filed the second of these suits on July 31,
2000, in part against outspoken patent critic Gregory
Aharonian. 164 Techsearch bills itself as "a privately held company
engaged in the business of buying, owning, and licensing patents
and patent interests, including pending applications.,,165 Like
Wegner, Aharonian has apparently never made, used, or sold the
invention that is the subject of the patent-in-suit. Instead, the
Techsearch complaint charges that "Aharonian has collected, sold
and distributed alleged prior art concerning [Techsearch's] '341

Federal Circuit decisions in which patent owners filed patent infringement suits to
suppress speech).
161. See Intellectual Property Owners Association, IPO Daily News, (Aug. 24 & 28,
2000) (reporting on the status of pending suits involving Reiffin and Techsearch), at
http://www.ipo.org/DailyNewsChron2000.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2002).
162. Id.
163. In re Reiffin, No. 624 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 2000), available at WL 1229009, *1. A
commentator has explained that:
Submarine patents are simple in concept. An inventor or the inventor's attorney
files an application with broad claims ... and then files a series of continuing
applications to keep the patent submerged in the patent office; then, one day,
someone innocently decides to use the yet to be patented idea, and after they
begin production, the inventor surfaces the application through its issuance, and
demands the payment of royalties, lest a lawsuit will be filed for infringement.
Steve Blount, The Use of Delaying Tactics to Obtain Submarine Patents and Amend
Around a Patent that a Competitor Has Designed Around, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'y 11, 13 (1999).
164. Intellectual Property Owners Association, IPO Daily News (Aug. 24, 2000), at
http://www.ipo.org/DailyNewsChron2000.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2002).
165. Techsearch, About Techsearch, at http://www.techsearch-llc.comlabouttxt.html
(last visited Aug. 6, 2002).
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patent and has publicly challenged the validity and enforceability
of the '341 patent."166
Stories such as these provide a saddening account of the
state of contemporary patent law. A critic of enacted legislation
or administrative action would normally be considered a
concerned citizen. Yet leading members of the patent community
both sue and have been sued for criticizing what amounts to a
federal regulation. These episodes remind us that patents
combine the attributes of public regulation and private property.
These dual attributes continue to prompt the same disturbing
question: May a patent restrict personal liberties in ways that
legislation cannot? Through examples, this Article next considers
the applicability of constitutional defenses to patent
infringement.

III.

PATENT ENFORCEMENT AS STATE ACTION

Patents that appropriate abortion procedures, parrot federal
law, or suppress speech, are among those that implicate
constitutionally guaranteed rights. 167 Yet whether an accused
patent infringer may assert a constitutional defense is not
entirely clear. The Constitution's guarantees of individual liberty
apply, with a few exceptions, only against the government. 16B
When a private entity serves as the plaintiff-patentee in an
ordinary infringement suit, an accused infringer may find resort
to the Constitution unavailing.
Resolution of this issue turns upon the state action doctrine.
Under the state action doctrine, constitutional guarantees may
restrict the conduct of private parties if that conduct is
sufficiently entwined with a governmental entity.169 The Supreme
Court has identified numerous factors that bear upon whether
private conduct can fairly be attributed to the state. 170 When the
166. Intellectual Property Owners Association, IPO Daily News (Aug. 24, 2000), at
http://www.ipo.org/DailyNewsChron2000.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2002).
167. Refer to Part ILA supra (providing an in-depth discussion on "patenting
abortion").
168. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) ("[T!he First and
Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and assembly by limitations
on state action, not on action by the owner of private property used nondiscriminatorily
for private purposes only."). See generally Strickland, supra note 115, at 592 ("In essence,
the Constitution governs American governments-not Americans.").
169. Refer to note 115 supra and accompanying text (indicating that sufficient
connections with government are required).
170. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (declaring that "fair
attribution" of an act to the state requires that (1) "the deprivation must be caused by the
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by
[the State! or by a person for whom [the State! is responsible," and (2) "the party charged
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nominally private party performs a traditional government
function,l71 is controlled by a state entity/72 or engages in conduct
that has been encouraged or substantially facilitated by the
government,l73 then the constitutional guarantees will apply.174
That the state action doctrine has been subjected to extreme
criticism should be noted from the outset. 175 Positive law theorists
teach that the government is the fountainhead of all personal
rights. 176 Within positivism, an attempt to distinguish the public
177
from the private lacks coherency from the outset.
Rights
scholars from other disciplines observe that in practice, in every
lawsuit asserting a private violation of rights, courts must choose
either to allow the violation to continue or to intervene in order
to prevent the violation. 17B From this perspective, state actors are
wholly incapable of exempting themselves from responsibility for
ensuring individualliberties. 179
Other commentators have found the· state action doctrine
more appealing. lBo The notion that private individuals somehow
with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor").
171. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149; 161-63 (1978) (declining to extend the
state action doctrine beyond "such functions as education, fire and police protection, and
tax collection" to "the function of so-called 'dispute resolution'" or "the field of private
commercial transactions").
172. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 394-400 (1995)
(determining that the National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), statutorily created
and controlled by the government, is an agency of the government rather than an
independent entity and therefore should not be able to evade constitutional guarantees).
173. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373-76, 378-81 (1967) (holding that a
California constitutional provision that prohibited the state from denying property owners
an unfettered right to decline to sell, lease, or rent real property to particular persons,
resulted in unconstitutional state authorization of private, racial discrimination in the
housing market).
174. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 290-93,
302 (2001) (declaring that the regulatory enforcement proceeding initiated by the state
interscholastic athletic association, a private organization, against one of its private
members, constituted state action largely based on the association's entwinement with
the government, which characterized it as a public entity subject to constitutional
guarantees).
175. E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. u. L. REV. 503,50405 (1985) (challenging the state action doctrine as unworkable, inconsistent, and
irrational).
176. [d. at 520,527 ("Under positivism all rights are derived from the government.").
177. [d. at 527. "There is no inherently private realm of individual behavior." [d.
"Everything that is allowed occurs because of the state's decision not to prohibit the
activity." [d. "Thus, all private violations of liberty occur because they are sanctioned by
the state's common law, and hence by state action." [d.
178. See generally David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165
(1999) (commenting that courts apply constitutional guarantees to the activity of some
actors while withholding the same guarantees from similar actors engaged in similar
activity).
179. See id. at 1262-63.
180. Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Case note on Flagg Bros. v.
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wield the power of the state in their everyday activities has been
described as "conspicuously artificial" and "disquietingly
totalitarian."181 Supporters have suggested that the state action
doctrine both preserves a zone of individual freedom and
prevents the imposition of liability upon the government for
private acts. 182 Experience teaches us as well that constitutional
provisions are broadly drawn and susceptible to dilution. By
preventing routine litigation from directly invoking our highest
governmental principles, the state action doctrine is said to
ensure the availability of robust constitutional principles in cases
of great moment. 183
This Article does not· seek to add another plank to either
state action platform. The patent law seems most unlikely to
serve as the rudder for lending order to a state action doctrine
that has so far avoided a coherent explanation. The ambition of
this Article is merely to assess whether a court is likely to hold
that a patent enforcement litigation commenced by a private
party sufficiently involves the state. If so, constitutional defenses
may yet play a role in patent infringement proceedings. If not,
then the sobering reality is that constitutional values may not be
able to contribute directly to restricting the current excesses of
our patent system.
A. Patent Fundamentals and State Action

Salient features of the patent law point in conflicting
directions concerning state action. Some patent law
fundamentals support the conclusion that private patent
enforcement constitutes state action. Unlike other intellectual
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1330 (1982) (positing that the state action doctrine
"servers] an important ideological function: it reflects and reinforces the ideas of natural
spheres of individual autonomy and a natural regime of property rights").
181. Frank 1. Goodman, Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal Theory, and a
Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1331, 1338 (1982).
182. See Peter M. Shane, The Rust that Corrodes: State Action, Free Speech, and
Responsibility, 52 LA. L. REV. 1585, 1587 (1992).
183. E.g., William P. Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking
"Rethinking State Action," 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 558, 564 (1985). Professor Marshall's
critique of Professor Chemerinsky's Rethinking State Action extends to Chemerinsky's
theory of adopting a balancing approach under the state action doctrine. [d. Marshall
argues that:
If one constitutional right is embattled against another, the protection accorded
one liberty is going to be diminished. The courts will be forced to articulate
priorities in constitutional liberties, with the result that certain liberties
eventually might be found to possess only secondary constitutional significance.
This in turn may lead to less protection being accorded these rights, even in
cases involving "pure" state action.
[d.
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property rights, patent rights arise only through direct
government intervention on an individual basis. Inventors who
seek patent protection are obliged to prepare applications and
place them before the Patent Office. 184 There, examiners review
each application on its individual merits and choose either to
reject the application or allow it to issue as a granted patent. 185
The ability to issue letters patent is exclusive to the federal
government. 186 In contrast to copyright and trademark, no
common law patent rights have ever existed in the United
States. 187
Augmenting the case for private patent enforcement as state
action is the notion that issued patents are inherently bound up
in the federal judiciary. The award of patent provides its
proprietor with nothing more than a grant to accuse others of
infringement in the federal courtS. 188 Patentees obtain no
affirmative right to practice the claimed invention, or indeed any
other grant or privilege whatsoever.189 Any exercise of patent
rights necessarily involves the formal invocation of government
apparatus. Patents can be licensed, of course, but the license is
"nothing more than a promise by the licensor not to sue the
licensee.,,19o
Patentees also appear to enjoy a symbiotic relationship with
the government. The patent system benefits the government by
creating a private class of innovators without resort to subsidy
from the public fiSC. 191 Inventors in turn obtain an exclusive
184. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2000) ("An application for patent shall be made, or authorized
to be made, by the inventor, except as otherwise provided in this title, in writing to the
Director.").
185. See id. § 131 ("The Commissioner shall cause an examination to be made of the
application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the
applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the Commissioner shall issue a patent
therefore. ").
186. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8.
187. Darren W. Saunders, Doing Deals 2002: Understanding the Nuts & Bolts of
Transactional Practice in an Uncertain Market, 1295 PLIICORP. 551, 555-57 (2002)
("Patents are governed solely by the U.S. Patent Act; there is no common law .... ").
188. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 ("A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for
infringement of his patent.").
189. C. Edward Polk, Jr. & Jonathan R. Spivey, Patent Law Basics: Understanding
the United States Patent System, 15 NAT'L BA MAG. 16, 16 (2001) (emphasizing that the
most fundamental aspect of a patent is that it "provides the right to exclude others, not
the right to make, use, offer for sale, or sell the patented invention").
190. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr, Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
191. See Robert D. Katz et aI., Advancing Claim Drafting and Amendment Writing
for Chemical Inventions, 585 PLIIPAT. 339, 343 (1999) (describing the "'quid pro quo'
[relationship) . .. between the inventor and the government" in which "the inventor
discloses his or her invention to the public and receives in exchange a grant, by the
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authority bound up in governmental authority.192 It would seem
appropriate that patentees accept constitutional responsibility
for an elevation in status that is voluntarily chosen.
On the other hand, patent enforcement may be considered as
essentially private in character. The decision to commence patent
litigation is wholly discretionary to the patent proprietor. 193 The
Patent Act, which does not regulate the conduct of patentees in
any manner, certainly does not compel individuals to enforce
their patents in a manner offensive .to protected individual
liberties. 194 Among the entities a patentee might choose to charge
with a patent infringement action is the federal government
itself. 195 Over the years, the United States has parted with
millions of dollars in patent royalty fees and adverse judgments
from the Court of Federal Claims. 196 With patentees frequently
playing the role of adversary to the state, identification of the
patent holder as a state actor seems difficult to countenance. 197
Both the Patent Act and our experience also reflect the
private nature of patent enforcement. The Patent Act informs us
that patents possess "the attributes of personal property," not
state regulation. 19B Recognition that virtually every large
corporation doing business in the United States is a patentee 199
also tempers enthusiasm for identifying patentees as state

government of the right to exclude others," thereby encouraging individuals and
companies "to invest substantial sums of capital in the development of the invention").
192. [d.
193. Refer to note 188 supra and accompanying text (indicating that the patent
holder also holds the right to sue for infringement).
194. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) (holding that a private
high school's decisions to discharge teachers "were not compelled or even influenced by
any state regulation").
195. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) states in relevant part:
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States is used or manufactured by or for· the Unite.d States without license of the
owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's
remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court
of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for
such use and manufacture.
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1966) (upholding patent
validity and thereby affirming the judgment to award the patent owner compensation for
the government's use of the patented invention).
197. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (agreeing that a public
defender does not ordinarily act under "color of state law" in part because "a defense
lawyer characteristically opposes the designated representatives of the State").
198. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
199. Cf John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 V AND. L. REV. 2099, 2116--17 (2000) (disclosing that
large corporations are being granted the "overwhelming majority" of issued patents).
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actors. To do so would essentially convert the entire commercial
world into the government.
Proponents of either view of the patent system200 appear to
have much doctrine at their disposal. In the face of these
competing factors, state action precedents would seemingly
contribute to the resolution of whether patent litigation
inevitably involves state action. In fact, the cases offer no easy
answers. The state action doctrine has been described as
confused, inconsistent, and hopelessly incoherent,201 but in the
area of intellectual property enforcement, the precedent presents
a true puzzle. In a line of state action cases considering statesponsored monopolies and license holders, a status akin to that of
the patent holder, the pronounced tendency is for the Supreme
Court to reject the application of constitutional defenses. 202 Yet
the Court has issued two decisions, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting CO. 203 and Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises,204 that feature lengthy substantive discussions of the
First Amendment in connection with the enforcement of
intellectual property rights. 205 Neither opinion presents even a
preliminary discussion of state action doctrine. In an attempt to
determine the role of the Bill of Rights in the patent law, this
Article parses in sequence these competing strains of case law.
B. The Licensing Cases

Cases concerning state-sponsored licensees and monopolies
suggest that the Court has been loathe to classify such
enterprises as state actors. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,206 for
example, the Court held that the mere fact that a state grants a
license-in that case, a liquor license to a private club-does not
transform the licensee into a state actor. 207 In Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co. ,208 the Court went further, refusing to
apply due process rights against an electrical utility for
disconnecting a customer's service without notice and fair

200.
Refer to notes 175-83 supra and accompanying text (exploring the views of the
proponents and opponents of the state action doctrine).
201. Chemerinsky, supra note 175, at 527; Marshall, supra note 183, at 558.
202. Refer to notes 206-16 infra and accompanying text (detailing the licensing
cases).
203. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
204.
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
205. See id. at 555-60; Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 569-79.
206.
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
207. [d. at 165, 177.
208.
419 U.S. 345 (1974).

HeinOnline -- 39 Hous. L. Rev. 597 2002-2003

598

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[39:569

hearing. 209 The Court concluded that although utilities enjoy
monopoly status and are heavily regulated, their actions were
not attributable to the state. 210 These holdings strongly suggest
that patentees, who receive a government-sponsored monopoly
but are otherwise unregulated, would not count as state actors
either.
A third decision, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S.
Olympic Committee,211 also seems damaging to the assertion that
intellectual property enforcement exercises necessarily invoke
state action. This case involved the congressional gifting of the
exclusive right to use the word "Olympic" to the U.S. Olympic
Committee. 212 The Committee brought suit against San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SFAA), seeking to restrain SFAA's use of
the word "Olympic" to describe an athletic competition that it
sponsored. 213 The Court rejected SFAA's facial challenge to the
federal law under the First Amendment. 214 The Court declined to
reach SFAA's Fifth Amendment argument, however, reasoning
that the Committee was not a state actor.215 According to the
Court, the Committee's "choice of how to enforce its exclusive
right to use the word 'Olympic' simply is not a governmental
decision."216
If neither the Moose Lodge, Metropolitan Edison, nor the
U.S. Olympic Committee are state actors, then a private citizen
with standing to assert patent rights likely does not qualify
either. Patentees are subject to considerably less government
entwinement than any of these other entities. Individual
decisions to procure patent rights, as well as to commence
enforcement proceedings, are both freely theirs. That no judicial
decision has yet applied a constitutional defense to patent
infringement also seems telling. Perhaps the constitutional
argument was unable to shelter accused infringers because the
patent law traditionally implicated economic rather than liberty
interests; but equally plausible is the rationale that all the
players believed that patentees were unlikely to be judged state
actors.
This chain of reasoning leads to a startling result. It is
entirely possible that a court may strike down legislation as
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

[d. at 347, 358-59.
[d. at 351-53.
483 U.S. 522 (1987).
[d. at 524, 526 & n.4.
[d. at 526-27.
[d. at 531-32, 540.
[d. at 543-45.
[d. at 547.
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violative of the Constitution, but enforce an identically worded
patent held by a private party. That a Nebraska legislator,
displeased with Stenberg v. Carhart,217 could procure and found a
lawsuit upon a patent claiming a partial-birth abortion technique
seems wholly incongruous. Yet numerous patents have already
issued on methods of performing abortions, and after State
Street,218 no meaningful limits upon the scope of patentable
subject matter exist. Concerns should only be heightened by the
realizations that patented speech has already been the subject of
a prior restraint and that litigation has already commenced on a
219
patent that tracks the precise words offederallegislation.
The licensing cases are not the only ones bearing upon the
state action implications of patent litigation, however. Other
precedent,22o and a substantial academic literature,221 explore the
First Amendment implications of enforcing copyrights and the
right of publicity. This line of decisions casts a more hopeful light
on the application of constitutional protections during patent
enforcement. Contrast between these decisions and the licensing
cases seems more to highlight the doctrinal confusion that
permeates the state action doctrine, however, than to relieve it.

C. The Speech Cases
In its first decision balancing intellectual property rights
and the First Amendment, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting CO.,222 the U.S. Supreme Court considered a cause
of action for a violation of the "right of publicity.,,223 The action
was brought by none other than a performer in a human
cannonball show, who claimed that a television station had aired
his act without permission. 224 The Ohio Supreme Court had held

217. 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (finding a Nebraska statute, which criminalized partialbirth abortions, unconstitutional). Refer also to notes 102-09 supra and accompanying
text (discussing the case).
218. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that any practical and useful invention
is eligible for a patent). Refer also to notes 22-33 supra and accompanying text
(discussing the case and its impact).
219. Refer to notes 125-32 supra and accompanying text (indicating that the claims
of State Street's Signature patent closely track federal tax laws and IRS regulations).
220. Refer to notes 222-60 infra and accompanying text (analyzing notable speech
cases that balance intellectual property and First Amendment rights).
221. For one compilation of citations to the academic literature, see Malia Pollack,
The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce
Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 47, 66 n.100 (1999).
222. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
223. Id. at 565.
224. Id. at 563-64.
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for the broadcaster based upon the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 225 Following a lengthy substantive discussion, the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments did not impinge upon the asserted
constitutional rights in that case. 226 Justice White's decision did
not stop to qualify human cannonball performance artists as
state actors against whom these constitutional provisions
presumably would apply.227
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprisei 28 is to
similar effect. There the Court frequently mentioned First
Amendment concerns while deciding that the unauthorized use
of President Ford's memoirs was not a fair use under the
Copyright Act. 229 As in Zacchini, both the copyright owner, Time
Magazine, and the accused infringer, The Nation, were private
actors. Once more the Court remained silent on the state action
.
230
Issue.
These two cases have founded the conclusions of numerous
commentators that enforcement of any copyright necessarily
involves the First Amendment. 231 These holdings are more
slippery than they may seem on first reading, however. A careful
review of Harper & Row reveals that while the Court refers
repeatedly to "First Amendment values," it carefully avoids
reliance upon the First Amendment itself.232 The Court actually
decided Harper & Row based upon the fair use privilege codified
at § 107 of the Copyright Act. 233 Zacchini is more difficult to
225.
See id. at 565-66, 569 (citing the Ohio Supreme Court's holding that the
broadcaster is "constitutionally privileged to include in its newscast matters of public
interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of publicity, absent an intent to
injure or to appropriate for some nonprivileged purpose").
226.
[d. at 578-79.
227. [d. at 566-79 (failing to discuss whether the "right of publicity" implicates the
state action doctrine); see also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95
F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that private enforcement of the right of publicity
constitutes state action).
228. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
229.
[d. at 555-60, 569.
230.
[d. (failing to discuss whether the "right of publicity" implicates the state action
doctrine).
231. E.g., Lemley & Volokh, supra note 139, at 185 n.179 ("There's no doubt that a
court's enforcement of copyright law to restrict private speech constitutes state action.").
232.
See Harper & Row, 471· U.S. at 555-60, 569 (reversing and remanding
"[b]ecause we find that The Nation's use of ... verbatim excerpts from the unpublished
manuscript was not a fair use").
233.
See id. at 560-69. The fair use doctrine is defined as "[a] privilege in other than
the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without
the owner's consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 415 (6th ed. 1991). The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107, expressly provides for
the balancing ofthe following four factors to determine whether the use was fair: "(1) the
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distinguish, but it is notable that in neither case were
constitutional defenses successfu1. 234 Under such circumstances,
the Court's substantive discussions could be dismissed as dicta.
Recognizing the limitations of Harper & Rowand Zacchini,
proponents of a role for the Constitution in intellectual property
enforcement usually turn quickly to New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. 235 In that case, the Alabama Supreme Court had
affirmed the award of a $500,000 judgment to a Montgomery city
official following a libel action against the New York Times. 236
The basis for the asserted libel was a published advertisement on
behalf of the civil rights movement. 237 Prior to overturning the
judgment on First Amendment grounds, the Court reached the
state action issue by explaining that "[a]lthough this is a civil
lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have
applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose
invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech
and press.,,238 This sweeping view of state action suggests not only
that the First Amendment applies to copyright and patent cases,
but that the entire gamut of constitutional protections applies to
the enforcement of all private rights under facially neutral laws.
Whether New York Times v. Sullivan enjoys this reach or
not bears further consideration. That decision's reasoning seems
rooted in the reasoning of Shelley v. Kraemer,239 a perplexing
decision that appears of marginal precedential value today.
There the Shelleys, an Mrican-American family, purchased
property that was subject to a private restrictive covenant
forbidding the sale of the property to non-white persons. 240
Owners of similarly restricted lots brought suit to prevent the
purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; [andl (4)
the effect on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." Harper & Row,
471 U.S. at 560--61.
234. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (refusing to extend the fair use doctrine in
light of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act);
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 564--66, 578-79 (1997) (declining to
grant First or Fourteenth Amendment protection to the broadcasting company that aired
an entertainer's performance without his consent).
235.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
236. [d. at 256.
237. [d. at 256-58 (reproducing statements from the March 29, 1960, advertisement
in the New York Times entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," which described a "wave of
terror" that allegedly denied southern African-American students some of their
constitutional rights and allegedly libeled a public official when it implicitly referred to
him as "police").
238. [d. at 265.
239. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
240. [d. at 4-5.
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Shelleys from taking possession of their property.241 Choosing to
enforce the private covenants, the Supreme Court of Missouri
enjoined the Shelleys from occupying their property.242 The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the state supreme court and held that
judicial enforcement of private restrictive covenants constitutes
state action. 243 The Court went on to find the restrictive covenant
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 244
Although the Shelley v. Kraemer Court has been admired for
its willingness to reach the correct result, its reasoning has been
viewed with suspicion virtually from the day the decision was
announced. 245 Many commentators found it unjust to implicate
the state with impermissible discrimination for merely giving
effect to a contract freely made by a private party.246 The Court
has not expressly overruled Shelley v. Kraemer in the intervening
years, but its holding has been severely marginalized. 247 Its
outcome appears a product of its times, the result of "the unique
problems of racial discrimination and the balance of substantive
rights at issue.,,248 For many, the advent of civil rights legislation
soon rendered the Court's ambitious view of state action
unnecessary and undesirable. 249 Some commentators have
suggested that Shelley v. Kraemer can literally be confined to its
precise facts, with its precedential value limited "to preventing
judicial enforcement of racially restricted covenants.,,250
241. [d. at 6.
242. [d. (concluding that enforcement of the restrictive covenant excluding persons of
a designated race or color "violated no rights guaranteed... by the Federal
Constitution").
243. [d. at 18-20, 23 (observing that, "but for the active intervention of the state
courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to
occupy the properties in question without restraint").
244. [d. at 20-21.
245. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 29-31 (1959).
246.
E.g., id. at 29; cf Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth Anniversary:
A Time for Keeping; A Time for Throwing Away?, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 82-84 (1998)
(acknowledging criticism that Shelley v. Kraemer's expansive view of state action may
destroy the doctrine altogether because of its potential application to all private action).
247. See, e.g., John Devlin, Construing an Alternative to "State Action" as a Limit on
State Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and Proposal, 21 RUTGERS
L.J. 819, 838 n.92 (1990) (observing that even though Shelley v. Kraemer has not been
expressly overruled, courts have generally not applied its principle outside the context of
race discrimination).
248. [d.
249.
See Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural
Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to "Private" Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV.
1263, 1284-86 (2000) (noting that the pressure mounting in the 1950s and 1960s
regarding the state action doctrine has since dissipated).
250. Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The Political
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The downfall of Shelley v. Kraemer may leave New York
Times v. Sullivan without much vitality. For what is New York
Times v. Sullivan but Shelley v. Kraemer attached to a different
constitutional amendment?251 In both cases, the plaintiff
employed a facially neutral law that offered no special status for
state officials. 252 Whatever constitutional excesses have been
attributed to the holding of Shelley v. Kraemer must surely apply
to New York Times v. Sullivan as well. 253
New York Times v. Sullivan might have served as a
conventional state action case. 254 Sullivan was, after all, a
Montgomery city official. 255 Perhaps the case could have
established libel law only for "public officials [acting] in their
official capacity.,,256 The difficulty with this reasoning is that soon
after issuing New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
expanded its reasoning not just to public officials, but to public
figures as well. 257 With Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts ,258 the
Supreme Court created another constitutional conundrum akin
to Shelley v. Kraemer. 259 A handful of decisions have recognized
this outcome, citing New York Times v. Sullivan as support for
an ambitious scope of the state action doctrine. 260 Little doubt
Economy of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights
Movement, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 247,291 (2000); see also Saxer, supra note 246, at 119-20
(arguing that unless Shelley v. Kraemer is restricted to "racially discriminatory private
covenants," it will destroy the state action doctrine by converting "all private action to
public action whenever a private litigant attempts to judicially enforce a private right").
251.
See Martin A. Schwartz & Erwin Chemerinsky, Dialogue on State Action, 16
TOURO L. REV. 775, 791 (2000) (opining that New York Times v. Sullivan "was [merely] a
private defamation suit, a private individual against the New York Times, a private
entity").
252. Kevin L. Cole, Federal and State "State Action": The Undercritical Embrace of a
Hypercriticized Doctrine, 25 GA. L. REV. 327, 353 (1990) ("Though Shelley and Sullivan
might theoretically have broad impact, the Court's refusal to so read those cases may now
be sufficiently clear that the cases can fairly be considered to be limited to their facts.").
253. James Boyle, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: The Clinton Years, 63 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 337, 340 (2000) (exposing the tenuous argument for finding state
action in New York Times v. Sullivan).
254. See Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1200
n.201 (2000) (asserting that New York Times v. Sullivan "was a conventional state action
case, because it was restricted to public officials in their official capacity," but soon "was
expanded to public figures").
255. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,256 (1964).
256. Sommer, supra note 254, at 1200 n.201.
257. [d.
258. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
259. Sommer, supra note 254, at 1200 n.201.
260. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) ("Our cases teach
that the application of state rules of law in state courts in a manner alleged to restrict
First Amendment freedoms constitutes 'state action' under the Fourteenth Amendment.");
Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1987)
("State laws whether statutory or common law, including tort rules, constitute state
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should remain that following New York Times v. Sullivan, the
First Amendment would justly be in play in litigation involving
patent rights that restricted speech. Presumably, an accused
infringer would argue that other constitutional protections, such
as due process or equal protection, should apply as well.
We are left, then, with competing lines of cases that suggest
different outcomes for determining whether state action inheres
in patent enforcement. Reconciliation of these cases, always a
perilous exercise in state action, reveals two possible
explanations for the more liberal view of state action in the
speech cases than in the licensing cases. Interestingly, while
these rationalizations affirm the place of the First Amendment in
copyright infringement cases, they seem of limited applicability
to patents.
One way to bring the speech and licensing cases to terms
rests on the recognition that, along with libel and obscenity laws,
copyright and the right of publicity intimately concern speech. 261
Both intellectual property laws potentially prevent individuals
from writing, composing, making public displays, or dancing as
they wish. 262 Not only do both bodies of law restrict the ability of
speakers to say what they want; constraining speech is all that
they do. 263 When the First Amendment forbids laws abridging the
freedom of speech, surely copyright and the right of publicity are
included. 264
Recognition of the essential nature of the right to freedom of
expression serves as the second basis for reconciling the licensing
and speech cases. Along with other cases implicating
fundamental .rights, the speech cases present circumstances
where courts are simply more willing to find state action. 265
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Metropolitan Edison, argued for a
action.").
261.
See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 139, at 165-66, 225 (noting that copyright law
restricts freedom of speech and that some courts have been willing to acknowledge the
First Amendment conflict in the right of publicity context, particularly the dangers of
prior restraint).
262. See id. at 165--66, 224-26.
263. Id. at 166, 224-28 (suggesting that copyright and right of publicity laws
generally restrict speech because copyright laws not only apply to creative adaptation but
also to literal copying, and because "likeness" is so broadly construed under the right of
publicity laws).
264. Id. at 182-83 (observing that characterization of a speech restriction as an
"intellectual property law" will not withdraw it from the scope of First Amendment
protections); see also Jackson v. Metro Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1974) (observing
that the scope of the monopoly regulated by the state in that case, namely an electric
utility, had little to do with the constitutional due process violation asserted).
265. Refer to notes 222-60 supra and accompanying text (analyzing speech cases
with respect to the state action doctrine).
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uniform state action doctrine that did not depend upon the scope
of the constitutional right in play.266 Other jurists and academic
commentators have disagreed,267 and a review of cases involving
race and other suspect categories suggests they have the better of
the argument. 268 Under this view, the doctrinal stability of the
state action doctrine is a worthy sacrifice given the higher
constitutional priorities at stake in the speech cases.
San Francisco Arts & Athletics is exemplary of the
heightened station accorded speech in state action cases. 269 Recall
that in that case, in addition to contesting the enforcement
practices of the U.S. Olympic Committee under the Fifth
Amendment, SFAA also mounted a facial challenge to the
Amateur Sports Act under the First Amendment. 27o Notable is
that the Supreme Court took up the First Amendment challenge
without separately analyzing its state action implications. 271
Seemingly apparent to the Court was that Congress was the
state actor for purposes of the First Amendment. 272 If the Court
was willing to invoke the First Amendment while assessing the
Amateur Sports Act,273 then the Copyright Act should fall under
similar constitutional scrutiny.
These two harmonizing rationales are capable of explaining
the prominence that the First Amendment enjoys within the
copyright law. Unfortunately, they yield unpromising results for
those who would turn to the Bill of Rights to curb the excesses of

266. 419 U.S. 345,373-74 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
267. E.g., Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices. and Corporate Virtues: Do
Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1484 & n.150 (1982)
(arguing that "everyone suspects, although judges rarely say, that what is 'public'
expands and contracts depending upon the substance of the plaintiff's claim" (citing King
v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 505 F.3d 264, 266 (6th Cir. 1974) (disaffiliating from the
trial judge's reasoning that "had the complaint been by Negro boys alleging racial
discrimination [rather than girl plaintiffs], he would have found state action 'more
readily'''))).
268. See Berman, supra note 249, at 1267-70 (analyzing the state action doctrine as
applied to cyberspace and arguing that "we must take the benefits of constitutive
constitutionalism into consideration before we can truly evaluate the appropriate
contours of our conception of state action"). Refer also to notes 239-44 supra and
accompanying text (analyzing Shelley v. Kraemer to illustrate that courts may be more
willing to find state action in the context of racial discrimination).
269. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 53542 (1987).
270. [d. Refer also to notes 211-16 supra and accompanying text (analyzing the
Court's decision).
271.
See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 535-42.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 536-37, 540 (holding that the Amateur Sports Act's restriction of
commercial speech did not violate the First Amendment because it was not broader "than
necessary to further a substantial governmental interest").
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the modern patent system. The Patent Act is broadly
structured274 and, until quite recently, has had little to do with
speech. Enforcement of the patent right may not be viewed as
necessarily implicating a discrete, fundamental right guaranteed
by the Constitution. More like a private property owner exerting
the trespass law to eject an unwelcome speaker, the relationship
between the patent right and a particular constitutional
guarantee appears more tangential. Even if a court were to apply
the First Amendment to patent cases, its willingness to invoke
the Constitution might not spill over to other provisions.
The tendency of courts to find state action in cases involving
compelling rights violations, such as racial discrimination or
speech restraints, may also be less pronounced for patents. Even
in a patent case that implicates a fundamental right, courts may
be unwilling to allow a hard case to make bad law. The decision
that a particular patent case involved state action would
seemingly implicate every patent enforcement exercise with the
entire panoply of constitutional defenses.
The reasoning that patentees will not ordinarily be judged
government actors seems paradoxical in light of other intellectual
property cases. The best reading of the case law remains that the
narrowly tailored copyright statute invokes the First
Amendment,275 but application of the more robust Patent Act does
not ordinarily entail any constitutional analysis at all. 276 This
conclusion will likely please commentators who have found the
state action doctrine wholly incongruous. It is considerably less
comforting for concerned observers who seek to cabin a patent
regime whose recent ambitions know no bounds. With hopes of
fashioning meaningful constraints upon the contemporary patent
system, this Article next turns to other constitutional provisions.
IV. CONTEMPORARY PATENTING TRENDS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES

That the once obscure patent system has come to bear
upon constitutional rights should be of particular concern to
civil libertarians. The patent canon, and to some extent the
274. 60 AM. JUR. 2d Patents § 65 (2002) (noting that the legislative history and
committee reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act support a broad construction and
indicate "that Congress intended statutory subject matter to include anything under the
sun that is made by man").
275. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 139, at 165-66 (noting that copyright law
involves the First Amendment because copyright law necessarily restricts speech).
276.
See id. at 232-34 (observing that the Patent Act prevents others from making,
using, or selling machines and processes, the restriction of which should not raise First
Amendment concerns).
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accumulated learning surrounding it, reflects a virtually
unyielding faith in industrial progress and market
mechanisms. Legislators have been encouraged to fashion
robust property rights, create bargaining institutions, and
establish compulsory licenses for those few instances in which
277
transaction costs prevent voluntary bargained-for exchanges.
This account holds little prescriptive power where patenting
has been divorced from technology and reoriented towards
advocacy. The preceding examples suggest that the following
six factors ought to play a role in patent enforcement
determinations.

1. Whether the Activities Constituting the Accused
Infringement Themselves Are Subject to Recognized
Protections. Enforcement proceedings should account for the
implications of the proprietary interest upon acknowledged
personal liberties. Courts should realize that individuals who
perform abortion techniques, comply with legal provisions, and
engage in speech enjoy substantive due process, equal
protection, and free speech protections whether or not that
behavior is also subject to patent rights. Whistleblowing
against suspect patents should also be considered not just as
an inducement of infringement, but as an exercise of freedom
of expression.
2. The Marketplace Availability of the Patented Invention
or Its Substitutes. Cases such as Stenberg v. Carhart 278 suggest
that individuals may have a strong interest in the continued
practice of a particular technique. 279 Where an accused
infringer legitimately claims that the asserted patent restricts
a recognized individual liberty interest, courts should consider
whether appropriate noninfringing substitutes are available
on the market. The case for infringement should be strongest
where the patentee itself markets a commercial embodiment of
the patented invention. Conversely, where no comparable
product exists and the patentee hopes to suppress the patented
invention, the case for patent infringement should be weakest.

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
207,210-16 (1996) (proposing legislative change in current intellectual property
law along the following three themes: (1) make clearer rules of law; (2) create property
rights in uncharted assets, such as domain names; and (3) create bargaining institutions).
278. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). Refer to text accompanying notes 102-15 supra.
279. See Stenberg, U.S. at 935-38 (implying that pregnant women desiring an abortion
may have strong health-based reasons to support the continued availability of the D & E
partial-birth abortion technique). Refer also to notes 102-15 supra and accompanying text.
277.

LEGAL F.
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3. The Ability of Others to Design Around the Patented
Invention. Many courts have observed that competitors of the
patentee enjoy the ability to design around the patented
invention. 280 However, experience teaches us that not all
inventions are so readily the subject of reverse engineering. In
such circumstances, courts should guard against the
possibility that the patentee will abuse its position. Essentially
a prospective version of present marketplace availability, this
factor also resembles copyright's merger doctrine. 281
4. The Reasons the Litigants Were Unable to Achieve a
License. Some patent cases involve market failures such as high
transaction costs or other externalities. 282 The patent law has also
attracted rights holders who seek to impose moratoria upon the
practice of the patented invention. 283 In either case, courts should
consider whether the refusal to license the patented invention
bears upon the patent law's goal of advancing the "useful Arts."
5. The Desire for Patent-Induced Innovative Activity in the
Field of the Patented Invention. Proponents of an ambitious scope
of patentable subject matter often contend that post-industrial
innovations present the same public goods problems as the
technologies that have long been patented. 284 Yet there are
important differences between industrial artifacts and the more
abstract behaviors that, innovative or not, have long been beyond
the grasp of the patent law. In enforcing patents on postindustrial invention, courts should also assess whether or not the
patent system is necessary to achieve optimal levels of research
and development expenditures within those fields. Courts should
consider whether the copyright law sufficiently spurs innovation
in speech or legal text, for example, and recognize that numerous

280. E.g., Ishida Co. v. Taylor, 221 F.3d 1310, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
281. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("In no case does a copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such a work.")
282. See O'Rourke, supra note 55, at 1188 (organizing market failures into three
categories: (1) high transaction costs' that frustrate private bargaining; (2) positive
externalities that prevent the infringer from being able to pay the copyright owner's price
for a license; and (3) the failure of any market for the particular use to develop).
283. Refer to notes 37-52 supra and accompanying text (discussing the NewmanRifkin human chimera application that, if accepted, could impose a twenty-year
moratorium on the use of chimera technology in the United States because neither
patent-seeker plans to use or further the patented technology).
284. E.g., Gregory J. Maier et aI., Patent Protection Provides Long-Term Net
Strategy, 22 NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18, 1999, at B11.
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private foundations presently fund research on abortion
procedures without resort to the patent system.

6. Whether Predecessors to the Patented Invention
Traditionally Have Been the Subject of Patenting. Relating to the
preceding factor is whether the patent system is deeply rooted in
the discipline from which the patented invention springs. Actors
within market sectors long subject to patenting are better able to
account for this form of market regulation. In contrast, courts
should recognize that actors in disciplines recently opened to the
patent system are less likely to have arranged their affairs
appropriately.
As a matter of systems engineering, the fashioning of a
subconstitutional restraint seems the best way to express these
values. A legislative limitation on patent acquisition and
enforcement that maintained the binding between patenting and
technology, acknowledged individual liberties, and was
specifically tailored to the patent system, would provide the best
solution for checking the current pretensions of the patent bar.
Revival of the defunct patent misuse doctrine,285 modification of
copyright's fair use privilege,286 and strengthening of the nascent
experimental use exemption287 each present possibilities.
Neither the Patent Office nor Congress seem likely to
initiate this project. The Patent Office wholly lacks competence to
do so, for it possesses no substantive rulemaking authority in
patent law. 288 It seems that the courts, having preliminarily
confronted patents on legal compliance and speech, will continue
to bear primary responsibility for adopting the patent system to
post-industrial patenting.
If this prediction is correct, then the U.S. Constitution
appears to be the sole source of legal doctrine in which the
principles identified above can be anchored. With the bulk of the
Bill of Rights likely inapplicable, another possible linchpin is the
285. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine,
78 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1608-32 (1990) (describing the patent misuse doctrine, an equitable
defense that permits "defendants in an infringement ... action [to] claim that the
patentee plaintiff had 'misused' its patent grant").
286. See O'Rourke, supra note 55, at 1205--09, 1249-50.
287. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 224-25, 230 (1987) (concluding that the
experimental use defense may be a way to reconcile the patent monopoly with the
research community's interest in building upon an inventor's discovery before the patent
expires).
288. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543,1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that
because the Patent Office does not have substantial rulemaking power, its promulgations
are essentially non-binding).
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Intellectual Property Clause. 289 For many observers, an
originalist interpretation of the Intellectual Property Clause
offers a plausible limiting account upon the scope of the patent
system. 290 When confining the scope of patenting to the "useful
Arts," the Framers likely contemplated only the industrial,
mechanical, and manual arts of the late eighteenth century.291
This characterization is also sympathetic to the maintenance of
constitutionally protected rights. Retaining patenting within its
traditional paths tends to maneuver the system away from the
appropriation of protected liberties.
Other commentators, however, have drawn scant hope from
the Intellectual Property Clause. 292 A textualist view of the
Intellectual Property Clause might decide only that patented
inventions must possess utility, a lenient stricture already
imposed by the patent system. 293 Even under the originalist
account, determining the proper successors of the Industrial
Revolution is exceptionally difficult. Contemporary human
engagement with the artificial is total. As human existence
becomes increasingly embedded in technology, the impact of
traditionally patentable subject matter upon the exercise of
individual liberties grows.
Yet perhaps another constitutional principle may be of use
in achieving patent reform. Frequently dismissed as a dead
letter,294 but exhibiting "fitful signs of life recently,,,295 the
289. See, e.g., Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of
the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 46 (2000) (arguing that the
language of the Intellectual Property Clause "may restrict some of Congress's more farreaching efforts in promoting intellectual property in recent years, particularly in passing
ad hoc extensions of copyrights and patents for the benefit of individual companies"). The
Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
290.
See Merges & Reynolds, supra note 289, at 46 ("From the earliest days of
our nation to the present era, courts have repeatedly stressed that Congress's intellectual
property powers under the [Intellectual Property) Clause are limited.").
291. Refer to notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text (reviewing the historical
roots of patent law as limited to the artifacts of the Industrial Revolution).
292. See Stern, supra note 125, at 105, 127-28 ("There is no way to reach agreement
on what is a useful art and, even more important, on what is not a useful art."); Merges &
Reynolds, supra note 289, at 60 (asserting that, while the Intellectual Property Clause
grants Congress the power to grant patents and copyrights for a "limited time," the length
of that time is discretionary; Congress has extended the term by post hoc legislation
favoring the patentee).
293.
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (providing that patentable subject matter includes
any "new and useful" improvement thereof).
294.
See, e.g., Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st
Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 943 (2000).
United Beverage Co. of S. Bend, Inc. v. Ind. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 760
295.
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non delegation doctrine 296 presents an unexplored possibility for
297
curbing the excesses of modern patent law. The pretensions of
modern patent law have clarified what might have been seen
earlier: patent acquisition is a legislative function that Congress
has bestowed upon private individuals. 298 Recognition of the
breadth of this conferral invites consideration of the
nondelegation doctrine to post-industrial patenting.
The zenith of the nondelegation doctrine occurred with the
well-known Supreme Court decisions in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. u. United States 299 and Carter u. Carter Coal Co. 300 In Carter
Coal, the Court held that Congress may not authorize private
groups to make law. 301 In both cases, the Court recited the
dangers of corruption, arbitrary enforcement, and lack of political
accountability that accompany private rulemaking. 302 That the
exercise of public power should reflect the will of the electorate
. a core vaIue 0 fd emocrat·IC governance. 303
remaIns
Much of what the Court said in these cases seems pertinent
to the contemporary patent law. When Justice Sutherland
announced that "in the very nature of things, one person may not
be intrusted with the power to regulate the business of another,
and especially of a competitor,"304 he might well have voiced
concerns over patenting. The procedures established by the

F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1985).
296.
See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 580 (2000) (describing the nondelegation doctrine as "the principle that Congress
may not delegate, to public or private actors, its constitutionally assigned lawmaking
power").
297. See id. at 580-81 (suggesting that resurrection of the nondelegation doctrine
would "constrain the private exercise of public power").
298. See id. at 580-82 (noting that despite the existence of the nondelegation
doctrine, Congress has bestowed lawmaking power on private individuals via delegation
to federal agencies, and the Supreme Court has upheld this delegation).
299.
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
300. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
301.
See id. at 310-11 (declaring the provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act, which provided producers and miners with congressional authority to regulate labor
and wages, an unconstitutional delegation oflegislative power).
302.
See id. (positing that permitting private coal producers and miners to regulate
employee hours and wages results in the submission of the minority to the will of the
majority, causing the minority to surrender to terms not out of choice but rather out of
force); Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 537 (holding that the delegation of authority to
private trade or industrial associations to establish a "Live Poultry Code" and thereby
regulate the industry, was an unconstitutional delegation of power "utterly inconsistent
with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress").
303.
See Boyle, supra note 253, at 350-51 (emphasizing the government's significant
role in developing intellectual property policy and criticizing the Clinton Administration's
regulation of speech in cyberspace as "unwise and unconstitutional").
304. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311.
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National Industrial Recovery Ace o5 and the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act,306 through which trade associations and private
groups could establish enforceable industrial codes, in fact seem
to compare quite favorably to current patent practice. Although
the Court condemned the power of a majority "to regulate the
affairs of an unwilling minority" as "legislative delegation in its
most obnoxious form,,,307 seemingly worse is the weekly grant to
hundreds of individual patentees the power to regulate an entire
industry in which they may not otherwise participate.
Although discussions of the nondelegation doctrine usually
begin with Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal, they most often
end there as well. Since the New Deal the nondelegation doctrine
has been of scant importance. 308 Virtually all observers of
government recognize that delegation of regulatory authority can
promote efficient governance. 309 So long as Congress provides
sufficient policy goals and procedural safeguards, the Supreme
Court has not been offended by legislative delegation in over half
a century.310 In particular, the federal courts have been troubled
only rarely by broad delegations of rulemaking power to
·
. 311
execut Ive
agencIes.
Still, the state courts have preserved the delegation doctrine,
often through the application of more specific nondelegation
provisions in state constitutions. 312 Exemplary is the recent decision
of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Leathers v. Gulf Rice Arkansas,
Inc. 313 That case involved state legislation authorizing a referendum
to be conducted among rice producers. 314 The rice producers were
allowed to approve an assessment against rice buyers, with the
proceeds to go towards rice promotion and market development
projects. 315 The Arkansas Supreme Court struck down the statute as
316
an unlawful delegation of the legislative taxing power. The court
observed that the statute imposed no standards to be considered
prior to imposing the assessment; caused the assessment to be
imposed without notice, opportunity to be heard, or review; and
305.
See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 521-24.
306.
See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 278-84.
307.
Id. at 311.
308. Zellmer, supra note 294, at 943.
309.
Id.
310.
Id.
311.
Id.
312. See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1191-1200 (1999).
313. 994 S.W.2d 481 (Ark. 1999).
314.
Id. at 482-83.
315.
Id.
316.
Id. at 486.
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authorized one group of private persons to tax a second, unwilling
. t e persons. 317
group 0 f pnva
The decision in Whitman u. American Trucking Associations,
Inc. (ATA)318 suggests renewed interest in the nondelegation
doctrine at the Supreme Court as well. The ATA Court reviewed
a District of Columbia circuit court decision,319 holding that
certain provisions of the Clean Air Act violated the nondelegation
doctrine by failing to provide an "intelligible principle" to guide
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in formulating
national ambient air quality standards. 320 The Supreme Court
reversed in a 9-0 decision, holding that the Clean Air Act fell
"well within the outer limits of our non delegation precedents.,,321
According to Justice Scalia, the terse instructions provided by
Congress to the EPA through the Clean Air Act compared
favorably with other provisions the Court had previously
upheld. 322
Although not a single dissenter railed against the majority
holding in ATA,323 the decision remains an important one for the
non delegation doctrine. Rather than wholly rejecting the
nondelegation doctrine as symptomatic of Lochner-era
jurisprudence, the Court instead cited Schechter Poultry and
other cases in its line with approva1. 324 The Court also confirmed
that "the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies
according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.,,325
Contrasting EPA regulation of obscure "country elevators" with
"setting air standards that affect the entire national economy,"
Justice Scalia observed that Congress would be required to
provide greater guidance for the latter than the former. 326
With the nondelegation doctrine once more in play, however
faintly, application of its principles to the modern patent system
appears quite timely. At first blush, this analysis may not appear
particularly fruitful. The Constitution includes an express
317.
[d.
318. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
319. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
320.
[d. at 1034.
321.
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474. The Court's decision with regard to Parts I and IV
was unanimous; Part III of the opinion, which discusses the delegation precedent, was
joined by seven of the nine Justices. See id. at 472-76.
322.
[d. at 462,473,475-76.
323. [d. at 486-87 (Thomas, J., concurring), 487-90 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment), 490-96 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
324.
[d. at 474.
325.
[d. at 475.
326.
[d.
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authorization for Congress to award exclusive rights to
inventors. 327 Surely the Framers contemplated delegation of
authority via the patent law. 328 While the Intellectual Property
Clause surely countenances delegation, however, there is no
reason to suspect that it collapses the core distinctions between
private and public lawmaking that undergird our scheme of
government. As suggested by historical experience with differing
patent acquisition and enforcement schemes,329 the Intellectual
Property Clause does not specify how public authority passes into
the hands of a private patentee, nor does it delimit specific
avenues of enforcement. 33o
Each issued patent instills in all of us the duty to avoid
practicing the patented invention without the permission of the
patentee. 331 Thus, there can be no question that Congress has
conferred rulemaking power through the patent system. 332 The
identity of the delegate is less apparent. Scholarly commentary
involving the delegation doctrine normally need not consider this
issue, for it focuses discussion upon so-called unified agencies.
Unified agencies, including the International Trade Commission
and EPA, combine "substantive rulemaking, enforcement, and
adjudication" functions. 333 In such circumstances, the delegate
obviously is the agency itself.
The sui generis regime of patents presents more complex
issues of delegation. The Patent Office obviously receives much
authority under the Patent Act, but its capabilities fall far short
of most federal administrative agencies. The role of the Patent
Office in the patent system is surprisingly limited. 334 Its principal

327. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
328. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful
Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 13, 38, 54 (1994) (considering the Framers'
considerations during the drafting of the Constitution).
329. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6-12 (1966).
330. Id. at 5-6 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, for the proposition that, although
the Intellectual Property Clause grants Congress broad power to award exclusive rights
for the promotion of the useful arts, the Clause does not specifY a procedure for awarding
these rights).
331. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
332. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-7 (stating that Congress may create a federal agency
to administer the patent system).
333. Brian C. Whipps, Substantial Evidence Supporting the Clearly Erroneous
Standard of Review: The PTO Faces Of{ Against the Federal Circuit, 24 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1127, 1150 (1998).
334. See Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. &
MARy L. REV. 127, 138 (2000) [hereinafter Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law] (describing the
ministerial nature of the Patent Office's roles).
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task is to facilitate the grant ofpatents. 335 The Patent Office lacks
substantive rulemaking ability even within the field of patent
law,336 and its regulatory authority is limited to managing Patent
Office proceedings and disciplining individuals licensed to
practice before it. 337 Crucially, the Patent Office neither enforces
patents nor adjudicates patent infringement disputes itself. 338
Authority for patent enforcement has been transferred to the
private sector, which essentially commences a qui tam action
with each charge of patent infringement in the courts.
Thus, in a very real sense, the Patent Office is not the sole
delegate of rulemaking power under the Patent Act. Private
individuals also enjoy a transfer of power through the Patent
Act. 339 Individuals themselves phrase the patent claims that, if
issued, amount to proprietary rights in privately drafted federal
regulations. As patentees they enjoy unfettered discretion to
enforce their patent right by bringing a civil action in federal
court. If everyone wants to be a regulator, the patent system
amounts to a leveling construct that encourages governance by
private citizens.
So patenting involves congressional delegation to both
Patent Office and private citizen. The next question is whether
this delegation is improper. Again, at first glance, this argument
seems quite feeble. The Patent Act is a complex code that
specifies Patent Office operations at a fine level of detai1. 340
Among the provisions of the patent code are a recounting of
patentability standards,341 description of patenting procedures,342
335. Id. at 138-40.
336. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543,1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
337. See Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law, supra note 334, at 166-67 (comparing the
Patent Office's power to manage proceedings to a federal court's power to manage its own
cases); see also 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (delineating the Patent Office's power to establish
regulations).
338. See Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law, supra note 334, at 143 (illustrating that
federal courts review patent suits in one of two ways: a direct appeal against the Patent
Office by a rejected patent applicant, or an infringement action against an alleged
infringer by a patent owner); see also John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court
with a Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 766, 772
(2000) (revealing that the Patent Office ''has no direct role to play in patent infringements
actions").
339. See Brian Kahin, The Expansion of the Patent System: Politics and Political
Economy, 6 FIRST MONDAY 1 (Jan. 2000) (noting that "[p]atents are, in effect, rules that
are drafted and proposed by . . . private applicants who have considerable leeway in
formulating and expressing the claims, approved by the [Patent Office], and then
privately enforced"), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue6_lIkahinlindex.html (last
visited Sept. 13, 2002).
340. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376.
341. Id. §§ 102-103 (requiring that the proposed patent be novel and non-obvious).
342.
See, e.g., id. § 111.
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and stipulation of the internal structure of the Patent Office. 343
The Patent Office seemingly acts well within the permissive
delegation standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in
ATA and predecessor cases. 344
But this analysis misses the mark for two reasons. First, it
overlooks the reality that the Patent Act confers considerable
authority to patentees as well. 345 No statutory mandates guide
patentees in their acquisition and enforcement of their
proprietary rights. 346 Patent owners are free to weigh any
particular values they wish, or none at all, when they undertake
to apply for patent rights or enforce them. If patentees are indeed
assessed as delegates under the Patent Act, then that statute
faces significant troubles under even the Supreme Court's most
lenient non delegation decisions. Lacking even a minimal
incantation about preserving the public interest, the patent
statute's wholly standardless delegation must count as an
impermissible one.
Second, Patent Office procedures are conspicuous for their
failure to employ the safeguards observed in modern
administrative law. Patent acquisition occurs in an ex parte
environment in which Patent Office personnel lack an
adversarial posture towards the applicant. 347 Examiners instead
are tasked to assist applicants in fulfilling the statutory
requirements. 348 As explained in the 2000 Patent Office Corporate
Plan: "The Patent Business is one of the [Patent Office's] three
core businesses. The primary mission of the Patent Business is to
help customers get patents."349
The accepted administrative protections of notice,
opportunity for comment, and judicial review350 also play little
role in the patent system. The Patent Office has traditionally
held all applications in secret, and even more recent legal
343,
Id, §§ 2-3,
344,
Refer to notes 299-333 supra and accompanying text (chronicling the
development of the nondelegation doctrine through Supreme Court decisions from
Schechter Poultry to ATA).
345.
See Kahin, supra note 339, at 1.
346.
See id. ("Once the patent is granted, the PTO engages in no form of external
review or quality control and takes no responsibility for the functioning ofthe system as a
whole.").
See id.
347.
348.
See Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law, supra note 334, at 138-39 (indicating that an
examiner's role is simply to "apply a legal standard determined by Congress and the
courts to the facts presented ... by the applicant").
349. See Kahin, supra note 339, at 1.
350. Refer to notes 313-17 supra and accompanying text (discussing the Arkansas
Supreme Court's Gulf Rice decision, which recognized these administrative protections).
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reforms call for only piecemeal publication of pending
applications. 351 Under this regime, the public has no sure way of
knowing whether a patent is about to issue or even whether a
patent application has been filed. 352 Patentees have frequently
sued competitors on the day a patent issues,353 the first point in
time at which anyone could have known the patent even existed.
Lack of notice obviously denies individuals the opportunity to
comment upon pending patent applications as well. These weak
procedural safeguards provided by the Patent Act are
accompanied by a growing suspicion that the Patent Office
cannot competently perform even its core examination
functions. 354
Judicial review applies to patent acquisition procedures only
in muted form. Disappointed patent applicants may appeal
Patent Office rejections to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit or the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia. 355 Members of the public possess no parallel right with
regard to issued patents, however. 356 An interested competitor
who sought a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity would
face dismissal unless the patentee had accused him of
infringement. 35? Even the Patent Office Director is unable to
appeal the approval of a patent application by a member of the
. .
358
exammmg corps.
Accused infringers do enjoy the dubious privilege of being
able to contest the validity of patents that have been asserted
against them.359 Practical constraints restrict this ability as well.
Issued patents bear a presumption of validity that must be

351.

35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2000).

352.

See id. § 122(b)(2).
353. John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place
of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 201 &
n.103 (1999) (highlighting recent cases in which patent infringement suits were filed on
the same day as the issued patent).
354. See Kahin, supra note 339, at 1 (suggesting that the Patent Office is not
organized in a manner that will benefit both the patentees and their competitors);
Merges, Six Impossible Patents, supra note 58, at 589-91 (describing problems at the
Patent Office).
35 U.S.C. §§ 144-145.
355.
356.
Pegram, supra note 338, at 772 (stating that patent procedures generally favor
patent owners and indicating that the only avenues available to a third party are to file a
protest against a pending patent, or to request reexamination of a granted patent).
357. See Lisa A. Dolak, Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Patent Cases:
Restoring the Balance Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. REV.
903,903-04 (1997) (discussing an accused infringer's limited rights against a patentee).
358.
35 U.S.C. §§ 141-146 (refusing to provide the Patent Office Director with
appellate review of patent applications).
359. Id. § 282 (discussing the defenses available to an accused infringer).
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overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 36o Defendants must
also bear the weighty costs of patent litigation361 and confront
courts that can be quick to issue preliminary injunctions.
In sum, then, nondelegation principles potentially present
serious concerns for the patent system. As a class of delegates,
patentees are wholly unregulated. Although the Patent Act offers
examiners intelligible standards to consider when analyzing
patent applications, the Patent Office has been notorious for its
inability to uphold them. 362 Decades of examining experience has
taught us that however comprehensible, these standards are not
practically achievable. Patent acquisition procedures also lack
acknowledged administrative safeguards. 363
Despite these severe suspicions about the whole of the
patent law, a court would seem less likely to apply the
non delegation doctrine to traditional subjects of industrial
property. Much like the "country elevators" of ATA,364 patents on
dental floss,365 fishing rods,366 and fluorescent toilet seats 367 do not
seem the subject of a particularly robust conferral of lawmaking
ability. The patent system's constitutional status and long
history of allowing private appropriation of technological
artifacts weigh against broad application of the nondelegation
doctrine to the entirety of Patent Office work product.
The likely reluctance of courts to apply the nondelegation
doctrine comprehensively against patenting should not be taken
360. Id.; see, e.g., Dana Corp. v. Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc., 279 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (recognizing that a patent's presumption of validity "can only be overcome by clear
and convincing evidence offacts to the contrary").
361. See Pegram, supra note 338, at 769 (noting the three primary defenses available
to accused infringers-noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability---each of which
can be asserted in seeking a declaratory judgment to resolve the dispute rather than
awaiting a suit by the patentee); see also Kahin, supra note 339, at 1 (warning that the
strong presumption of validity results in "higher transaction costs on those who seek to
challenge patents and exacerbates the free-rider problem of invalidating patents," which
frequently forces the accused infringer to settle the dispute rather that pursue a viable
attack on the patent's validity).
362. See Kahin, supra note 339, at 1 (critiquing the patent system's level of quality
by pointing to "the limited knowledge and experience of patent examiners" as well as "the
difficulty of applying such a [subjective patent] standard in [a] volatile and fast-changing
environment"); Merges, Six Impossible Patents, supra note 58, at 589-91.
363.
Refer to notes 313-17 supra and accompanying text (discussing the Arkansas
Supreme Court's Gulf Rice decision, which acknowledged proper procedural and
administrative safeguards).
364. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (referencing the
exemption of "country elevators" from new stationary-source regulations).
365. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,819,767 (issued Oct. 13, 1998) ("Sterile Dental Floss
Segments").
366.
E.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,000,164 (issued Dec. 14, 1999) ("Fishing Rod").
367. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,151,723 (issued Nov. 28, 2000) ("Toilet Seat Lifter with
Leverage Adjustment").
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as a weakness. Courts ought to recognize that alongside the
Patent Act, individual patent instruments themselves embody
congressional conferrals of legislative power. That the
nondelegation doctrine may be used selectively, against discrete
patent instruments, increases the likelihood it will be applied in
the first place. ATA and its predecessors further support a
selective approach. These precedents contemplate a sliding scale,
where the case for a nondelegation violation is strongest, and
where the scope of the congressional conferral is greatest. 36S
Surely
private
appropriations
implicating
protected
constitutional interests should be subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny.
Where state action may lead to restrictive judicial
supervision of the patent system, the nondelegation doctrine
would enable courts to take aim at private appropriations that
implicate protected constitutional interests. No longstanding
patent practice checks the application of nondelegation principles
here. The Patent Office has only recently allowed individuals to
procure these sorts of patents, and it arguably lacks a firm
constitutional grounding when doing so. Potentially a sobering
influence upon a patent system run amok, the nondelegation
doctrine provides an underappreciated avenue for restraining
patents that offend cherished individual liberties.

v.

CONCLUSION

With Congress showing no apparent signs of interest in
curbing the scope of patenting, courts may find the nondelegation
doctrine an appropriate vehicle for recognizing public restrictions
upon private governance. Acknowledgment that patenting
principally serves a legislative function, and that private citizens
have themselves been conferred lawmaking power, are necessary
steps for recognizing non delegation arguments in this context.
These steps ought to be taken. With application of the state
action doctrine and Intellectual Property Clause uncertain, the
nondelegation doctrine offers accused patent infringers a
backdoor to the Bill of Rights. If the account of the modern
patent system is appropriately constructed, the Constitution may
yet serve as a meaningful restraint upon the excesses of the
dizzying ambitions of the contemporary intellectual property
community.
368.
See TRIBE, supra note 150, at 365 ("The Supreme Court is most likely to reject
broad delegations of congressional power, typically on statutory grounds, when the action
of the government agency claiming delegated power touches constitutionally sensitive
areas of substantive liberty.").
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